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Abstract 
Public opinion is important for advanced and aspiring democracies because it is the 
people that are the ultimate source of power in these societies. Peoples’ attitudes 
towards economic questions are thus important for a country’s economic policy. In 
this thesis, it is peoples’ attitudes towards welfare that are in question. Welfare 
attitudes are affected by both individual and contextual factors, as for instance 
globalization. In this thesis I seek to answer the overall research question: “How does 
economic globalization affect welfare attitudes?” By using multilevel modelling to 
analyse data from over 70 countries, I find that economic globalization does affect 
welfare attitudes, and the results indicate a rightist shift in attitudes. However, the 
effect is different for globalization winners and losers – in both individual and country 
sense. Increased economic globalization seem to lead to more leftist attitudes in 
developing countries, while the effect is reversed for developed countries. The 
findings also suggest that individuals with high skill-levels have more rightist 
attitudes than individuals with low skill-levels. The difference between these groups 
is larger in countries with high degrees of economic globalization.  
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1 Introduction	  
 
Public opinion on economic questions is important for advanced and aspiring 
democracies because it is the people that are the ultimate source of power here. When 
governments decide on what economic policy they should pursue, it is therefore 
important that they take public opinion into account. Public opinion is affected by 
several different factors. Amongst these factors we find globalization. Globalization 
as an overall phenomenon is a complex set of changes that affects nearly all aspects of 
society in every country of the world, including questions regarding the role of 
governments. Thus, research on the effects of globalization is relevant as it influences 
people’s welfare attitudes. This has inspired the overall research question of this 
thesis, which is: “How does economic globalization affect welfare attitudes?”  
In this thesis I seek to measure a general level of welfare attitudes by 
employing a measure of whether the state should have more responsibility, or if 
individuals should provide for themselves. Kumlin (2007) argues that the concept of 
welfare attitudes is linked to the left-right dimension in politics. Here, leftist attitudes 
are synonymous with support for state intervention, high levels of social equality, a 
large public sector, a redistributive tax system and welfare benefits. Rightist attitudes 
are on the other hand more correlated with support for less state intervention, private 
ownership of business, individualism and a marked-driven economy.  
In explaining what influences welfare attitudes, Finseraas and Ringdal (2012) 
argue that there are some stable patterns to be observed. These are self-interest and 
the objective risk of income loss. In other words, the present income situation of the 
individual and an assessment of how the future income situation might be are 
important factors in determining attitudes towards welfare. If the present and future 
income situation is good, individuals might be more likely to develop rightist 
attitudes, but if the present and future outlook of income is bad, this might lead to 
more leftist attitudes, because of the possible need for welfare benefits. 
Contextual factors can strengthen and influence people’s welfare attitudes. 
The contextual factor in question in this thesis is globalization, or more specifically, 
economic globalization. With growing cross-boarder relations and interdependence 
between countries, in addition to the removal of trade barriers, foreign exchange rates 
 2 
and capital control, there is no doubt that economic globalization has affected the 
global economy, and thus the people that are a part of it. However, there exists a 
disagreement of whether these effects are positive or negative (Scholte 2005). 
Neoliberals are pro–globalization and argue that globalization leads to economic 
growth and prosperity. On the other side are the anti–globalizers, known as 
traditionalists, who sees globalization as a harmful phenomenon and a source of 
global inequality. 
The purpose of this thesis is to investigate the relationship between economic 
globalization and welfare attitudes. Because economic globalization tries to lead the 
way towards an open and borderless world economy, the consequences might be 
higher risks of outsourcing of jobs and import of goods produced in low-wage 
countries. For individuals with low skill-levels, the consequences of economic 
globalization can lead to an increase in the individual level of economic insecurity. 
This will according, to the compensation hypothesis, create demands for an expanded 
welfare state that can protect against the external shocks and volatility caused by 
economic globalization (Walter 2010). The opposing view states that economic 
globalization will lead to more rightist attitudes and demands for a more open 
economy, because as a country becomes more economically globalized it will 
experience economic growth and prosperity (Scholte 2005). This will thus affect the 
public, who in turn will, in accordance with rational choice theory (Downs 1957), 
demand more individual responsibility and a less extensive welfare state because they 
do not need the state to act as a caregiver.  
As much of the research on welfare attitudes is done on samples of 
industrialized Western countries (e.g. Dallinger 2010; Finseraas 2008; van Oorschot 
2006; Jæger 2006; Blekesaune and Quadagno 2003) there has been little focus on 
developing nations. With this thesis I attempt to contribute in filling this gap. The data 
used in the analyses of this thesis consists of over 70 countries from different parts of 
the world. This gives me the opportunity to investigate possible differences in the 
effects of globalization on public opinion between developed and developing 
countries.  
In this thesis I attempt to test the two opposing views presented above, in 
addition to testing if there is a difference in the effect of economic globalization on 
globalization winners and losers, both in individual and country sense. To do this I 
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perform a multilevel analysis, using individual data from four waves of the World 
Values Survey, supplemented by contextual data from the KOF Index of 
Globalization (Dreher, Gaston and Martens 2008), the World Bank (2012) and the 
Standardized World Income Inequality Database (SWIID) (Solte 2009).  
The result of the multilevel analysis indicates that increased economic 
globalization leads to a rightist shift in welfare attitudes among the public. But this 
rightist shift seems to happen only after a certain level of economic globalization.  
However, the results show that the effects of economic globalization are more 
complex than a simple leftist or rightist shift in attitudes. There seems to be a 
difference between the effects of economic globalization in developed and developing 
countries, where citizens in developed countries develop more rightist welfare 
attitudes, while citizens of developing countries become more left oriented. The 
results also indicate that there is a slight difference between globalization winners and 
losers at the individual level, where globalization winners have more rightist attitudes 
than globalization losers.  
The findings presented above are discussed more thoroughly in chapter 4. The 
rest of the thesis is organized as follows. In chapter 2 I define the concepts of welfare 
attitudes and economic globalization before I present and discuss the theory that 
constitute the two opposing views on the effects of economic globalization on welfare 
attitudes. In chapter 3 I elaborate on the research design and data used in the analyses 
of this paper. Here I also discuss the method of analysis; multilevel modelling, and 
present the limitations connected to this analysis. In chapter 5 I will summarise the 
findings of this thesis, and attempt to draw the lines to further research. 
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2 Theory on Economic Globalization and Welfare Attitudes 
 
Does economic globalization influence the public’s attitudes towards welfare? And if 
so, in what way does it affect people’s welfare attitudes? These are central questions 
that I attempt to investigate further in this thesis. However, some important features 
need to be clarified. 
First, the concepts of welfare attitudes and economic globalization need to be 
defined and explained in detail. Secondly, these concepts have to be placed in their 
scientific context by discussing the most relevant theory and previous research 
revolving around them. In this chapter I will elaborate on the theories behind the two 
competing theories I test in this thesis.  
The two first hypotheses assume a rightist shift in attitudes because of 
increased economic globalization, based on the neoliberal argument, which states that 
economic globalization leads to economic growth and prosperity. According to 
rational choice theory, individuals will act in their own self-interest and therefore 
support more individualistic values when they do not need the safety net of the 
welfare state. The third hypothesis challenges the two first with basis in the 
compensation argument; a hypothesis which states that higher degrees of 
globalization leads to more leftist attitudes in the public because of the economic 
insecurity that follows globalization. With the four last hypotheses I attempt to 
investigate the possible differences in welfare attitudes between developed and 
developing nations, and globalization losers and winners.  
 
2.1 Public Opinion 
The basis of all research on public opinion is based on the assumption that public 
opinion affects policy outcomes. This principle of popular sovereignty is fundamental 
for all democratic countries that strive to uphold the most sincere idea of democracy 
since its emergence in ancient Greece. Scholars from Plato to Hobbes and Mill have 
all underlined the importance of public participation. Rousseau argued that the role of 
the citizen is the highest to which an individual can aspire, because “the considered 
exercise of power by citizens is the only legitimate way in which liberty can be 
sustained” (Held 2006: 46). Scholars from the camp of competitive elitism, like 
Schumpeter, have argued that the essence of democracy is the ability of the citizens to 
 6 
use their right to vote to replace one government with another (Held 2006). 
Supporters of the deliberative democracy see democracy as a means to “…protect the 
liberty of citizens and to maintain the minimum public goods necessary for citizens to 
go about their self-chosen ways” (Held 2006: 231). As we can see, public opinion and 
participation is discussed in different ways, but the importance of these factors are 
emphasized in different camps of democratic theory.  
Since governments in democratic countries to a large degree are at the mercy 
of its people, it is crucial that they take public opinion into consideration when 
deciding what kind of policy to pursue. According to Wlezien and Soroka (2007) a 
fundamental principle of democratic government is that policy is a function of 
opinion. This can be expressed formally, as follows: 
 
P = f{O} 
 
Here, P represents policy and O represents opinion. Wleizen and Soroka (2007) 
emphasizes that they expect a positive relationship between opinion and policy – that 
the public get the amount and the right kind of policy they demand. The truth of this 
function is of course varying in different kinds of countries. A lot of research done on 
political representation is done on the political system in the United States. This part 
of the research field, focusing on dyadic representation, argues that there is a 
“representation relationship” between the individual representatives and the 
individual constituencies (Wleizen and Soroka 2007).  
In many ways the political system in the United States is not always 
compatible for comparison with other countries’ political system of representation. 
Therefore, it may be more useful to look closer into collective representation rather 
than dyadic representation. When discussing the former, representation is located in 
the overall functioning of the entire representative policy-making system – not in the 
behaviour of individuals.  Compared to dyadic representation, where the outcome 
could be the US members of congress’ votes, the outcome of collective representation 
is policy, as in the policy-making system.  
Here, Wleizen and Soroka (2007) distinguish between three different 
approaches in the literature. The first approach, known as consistency, tries to explain 
to what degree policy change is consistent with a public preference for policy change. 
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Drawing on Monroe’s (1979; 1998) work on representation in the United States, 
consistency refers to the relationship between public preferences for changes in 
policy, and the actual changes. This approach is known for using survey questions, 
which asks about changes in policy, and then examining the relationship between 
those respondents who favour change and the actual changes in policy (Wleizen and 
Soroka 2007: 802). These analyses result in a consistency score for either separate 
policy domains or different time periods. In Monroe’s study of 556 cases in the time 
period between 1981 and 1993, he finds a consistency score of 55 percent, indicating 
that policy and public opinion are “on the same page”. But this kind of studies cannot 
establish a clear causal link between public opinion and policy change. This requires 
data over time, which can show that public preference precedes policy change. 
An alternative approach, which has a higher chance of being able to establish 
the causal link between opinion and policy change is the study of policy covariation. 
This approach measures the relationship between policy and opinion across time 
and/or space by using a survey question that is asked at different time points, and 
comparing this to the proximate policy change (Wleizen and Soroka 2007). Page and 
Shapiro (1983) studied over 300 federal US policy issues from the mid-1930s to the 
late-1970s, and found that policy change often precedes measured opinion change. 
However, this approach is limited by the short period over which preferences and 
policies are measured, and this still makes it difficult to assess the causal link between 
opinion and policy change. The last approach revolves around policy congruence. To 
investigate how policy development is congruent with changes in public preferences 
for policy, one needs dynamic data.  
As the studies mentioned above emphasizes, the opinion of the public are 
without a doubt important determination factor for policy outcomes. When it comes to 
welfare attitudes, public opinion on economic question like these is important for how 
governments carry out their politics through policy on for instance how much 
responsibility the state should have and the degree of redistribution.   
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2.1.1 Public Opinion on Economic Questions: Welfare Attitudes 
A country’s economic policy is affected by its people’s attitudes towards welfare, that 
is, their opinions on how the goods in a society should be distributed. These attitudes 
were often explained by individual factors such as income, gender, age and class (see 
for example Campell et al. 1960; Valen and Katz 1964), and a well-known conclusion 
of these types of analyses is that people with high socioeconomic status have been 
known to be more sceptical towards redistribution and regulation of the market than 
people with lower socioeconomic status. However, since the emergence of 
comparative surveys and multilevel analysis as a statistical method there has been 
more focus on how attitudes vary between countries and how macro factors can affect 
public opinion (Jakobsen, Aalberg and Heggem 2012: 342).  
According to Kumlin (2007) we can identify three levels of welfare attitudes. 
The first level consists of general welfare state support. Here we find people’s 
orientations toward symbolic concepts like equality, redistribution, taxation and 
privatization. The second level is made up by people’s specific policy preferences 
towards various aspects of the welfare state, for instance policies aiming at 
redistribution or basic pensions and unemployment benefits. Level three consists of 
even more specific evaluations of welfare state related “performance”, as for example 
how satisfied the people are with public health services or education.  
The general support towards the welfare state is according to Kumlin (2007) 
both conceptually and empirically linked to the left–right dimension in politics. A 
person’s attitudes towards the welfare state will reveal his or hers stand in the 
traditional conflict of how much the state should intervene in the market economy and 
its outcomes. Support for state intervention in the market economy, in addition to high 
levels of social equality, a large public sector and a highly redistributive tax system is 
often related to leftist attitudes, while the opposite often is true for rightist attitudes.  
However, Kumlin (2007) emphasizes the importance of distinguishing 
between the input and output side of the welfare state. The attitudes towards the 
output side of the welfare state include the appeal and function of the different 
transfers and services the state provides for the individual. The input side deals with 
the financing of the output side, with means such as taxation. If a person experience 
that his or her payments to the government are unrelated to the actual benefits he or 
she receives, the person will most likely feel that he or she are not getting their 
money’s worth and may develop a more rightist attitude towards the welfare state, as 
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for instance by supporting less taxation. This hypothesis may be true, but there are 
also studies that reveal that citizens in fact underestimate the costs of an active 
welfare state.  If the citizens are informed about the cost, their support for public 
spending tends to be reduced (Winter and Mouritzen 2001).  
Other studies suggest that people sometimes want “something for nothing”. 
This attitude manifests itself when people have a general positive attitude towards 
public spending, without thinking about the need for input. Confalonieri and Newton 
(1995) find that even when respondents are asked survey questions where they are 
reminded of the link between public spending and taxation, they still show 
preferences that resemble “unpriced” priorities (Kumlin 2007).  
Kumlin (2007) suggest that time and context, social class, self-interest and 
social justice affect people’s welfare attitudes. In this thesis, the time and especially 
the contextual explanation is regarded as important, seeing as the topic revolves 
around how a contextual factor like globalization can influence people’s attitudes 
towards welfare. An individual with low skill level in a developed country may feel 
less affected by the risks of economic globalization than an individual with low skill 
level in a developing country, because the effect of losing your job may be more 
severe in poorer countries.  
Even though the contextual factors are important, it is vital not to overlook the 
individual factors. There are often interactions between a person’s individual 
attributes and the context of the society in which the person live, which together have 
an effect on his or her attitudes towards welfare. With regards to social class, we can 
say that the working class usually is more left-oriented than the middle class (Kumlin 
2007). This can manifest itself in education levels and sectors of employment. While 
an unskilled worker in a sector vulnerable to offshoring may be more positive towards 
redistribution, a skilled worker might not have the same preferences since he or she 
are more likely to earn more money and have higher levels of job security. This 
causal relationship essentially builds on another important individual factor, namely 
self-interest.  
The hypothesis of self-interest holds that people define their attitudes towards 
welfare on the basis of personal benefits and risk-reducing consequences of policy to 
insure that they gain from their policy preferences. According to Kumlin (2007) self-
interest seems to matter more when analyzing specific policy preferences, but only 
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moderately for general support. This is because the personal risks associated with 
different alternatives are easier to assess because when choices are concrete (Sears 
and Funk 1991; Huseby 1995). It is easier for people to assess if one benefits from 
government spending on unemployment benefits or public child care than it is to 
estimate their individual benefits from a more general and symbolic concept like 
“equality” or “redistribution”.  
While all three levels of welfare attitudes are important, this thesis will focus 
on individuals’ general welfare attitudes. This is done by employing a dependent 
variable that measures how much responsibility the government should have. Even 
though this thesis focuses on general welfare attitudes, it is important to point out that 
attitudes towards welfare are complex and measuring it can be somewhat problematic. 
By using one dependent variable, which focuses on government responsibility, I 
reduce the concept of welfare attitudes to this question. This is unfortunate, but 
assessed as the most practical alternative to using a scale.  
Finseraas and Ringdal (2012) argue that there are some stable patterns to be 
observed when investigating people’s attitudes towards welfare. They emphasize self-
interest as an important factor, and find that these attitudes often are affected by 
whether a person generally benefits or contribute to public welfare. This argument 
indicates that a person with low income and low skill level should be very supportive 
of a expansive welfare state, because he or she might benefit from this in terms of 
social services and unemployment benefits. This argument is supported by Cusack et 
al. (2006) who demonstrate how risks affect preferences for redistribution. Another 
important factor in determining people’s welfare attitudes are the objective risk of 
income loss. In other words, an individual’s support for public welfare is dependent 
on an assessment of whether or not he or she expects their income situation to be in 
the future. For instance, one could picture that some students, with low income level 
in these years for education, can develop rightist views on government responsibility 
because they assess that in a few years their income level and skill level are higher, 
and they regard themselves as future contributors to public welfare. Thus, supporting 
an extensive welfare state is not in their best self-interest, from a rational-actor 
perspective.  
All of these factors have one thing in common: they proxy levels of risk in 
one-way or another. Economic situation, employment status, level of education and 
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even family situation are all factors that influence a person’s risk assessment 
(Finseraas and Ringdal 2012; Cusack et al. 2006). The important assumption here is 
that higher risk of income loss will create higher support for welfare. However, the 
effects of individual factors like these can be strengthened by contextual factors.  
 
2.1.2 The Importance of Macro Factors 
When studying public opinion it is important to be aware of the relationship between 
macro-factors and the opinion of the individual. Public opinion is often rooted in a 
value structure, and this in turn is influenced by national contexts like a country’s 
institutional organization, policy, level of unemployment and economic development. 
These macro variables can influence public opinion in several ways; for instance 
through education, the media, or more directly if an individual becomes unemployed 
(Jakobsen et al. 2012; Jakobsen 2011).  
However, in this paper the main focus is not on public opinion in general, but 
more specific on the public’s opinion towards welfare. In other words, their attitudes 
towards how much responsibility the state should have in their society. Jakobsen et al. 
(2012) distinguish between two main categories of macro factors that influence public 
opinion’s attitudes toward economic questions like these. The first one is related to 
the political system, with regime effects and size of the public sector as the most 
important factors, while the other one is related to the economy, with social 
inequality, unemployment and economic development as the most important macro 
factors.  
There have been a number of studies on how different macro factors like these 
affect public opinion on economic left-right attitudes (e.g. Finseraas 2008; 
Blekesaune and Quadagno 2003). These studies have usually been limited to 
European countries, or members of the OECD. The research on the different macro 
factors has shown that only some of them have a strong effect on public opinion. 
There has for example not been found much support for regime effects on people’s 
attitudes towards economic policy (Jæger 2006; Svallfors 2003; Aalberg 2003). On 
the other hand, several studies have found a positive relationship between the size of 
the public sector and the public’s demand for redistribution (Dallinger 2010; 
Finseraas 2008; Jæger 2006). 
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In general, the field of research focusing on the economic macro factors has 
uncovered a negative relationship between a high standard of living and demands for 
redistribution (Dallinger 2010; Finseraas 2008; Jakobsen 2011). This seems to be true 
for both economic growth within different countries and for economic development 
across different countries. On the same note, other studies have revealed a positive 
relationship between unemployment and citizens’ support for welfare (Rehm 2009; 
Blekesaune 2007; van Oorschot 2006; Blekesaune and Quadagno 2003). These 
studies are important in regard to the theme of this paper, since we can assume that it 
is people’s fear of unemployment and a decrease in standard of living that is 
influenced by globalization.  
2.2 Economic Globalization 
To be able to investigate the influence globalization has on public opinion towards 
economic welfare it is important to know more about this phenomenon. In this paper I 
will sometimes employ the term globalization to the phenomenon that more 
specifically can be named economic globalization. Globalization as an overall 
phenomenon is a complex set of changes that affects nearly all aspects of society in 
every country of the world, and the relationship between these countries. Dreher et al. 
(2008) argue that globalization needs to be defined as broadly as possible, and sort 
globalization into three sub-categories: economic-, political-, and social globalization. 
They define economic globalization as the long distance flows of goods, capital, 
services, and the information and perceptions that follow these market exchanges 
(Dreher et al. 2008). However, this is a broad definition, and to be able to understand 
the phenomenon of economic globalization it is vital to look closer at this concept.  
First, we can identify two important features of economic globalization both 
derived from Scholte (2005). The first one is internationalization, which means the 
development of cross-border relations between countries, growth of international 
exchange and interdependence. The other one is called liberalization, and it indicates 
the removal of government-imposed restrictions on movements between countries in 
order to create an open and borderless world economy, and the reduction of trade 
barriers, foreign-exchange restrictions, capital controls and visas. These features are 
intertwined. Cross-border relations between countries have more or less developed 
because of the growth in international exchange and interdependence. The reduction 
of trade barriers, foreign-exchange restriction and capital controls has made it easier 
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to develop the international exchange and interdependence further. Both 
internationalization and liberalization have developed over time, and together they 
characterize the global economy in a striking manner.  
2.2.1 History 
Economic globalization traces its roots back to when Ancient Rome started trading 
goods with China. Since then the world economy has developed via the 
mechanization of production in Europe during the Renaissance, through the 
mercantilism of the 1600s, and further into the industrial revolution in Europe during 
the mid-1800s. One of the most striking effects of the industrial revolution was the 
quadrupling of international trade in the time period between 1850 and 1880 (Claes, 
Hveem and Tranøy 2012: 93). The same period in time is also characterized by the 
development of free trade politics in the United Kingdom, which later spread to the 
rest of the European states, and the gold standard system.  
The world economy suffered setbacks because of the two world wars. 
However, after World War II, the international economic system was on the agenda 
under the famous Bretton Woods conference of 1944. Here, some of the most 
important international economic organizations that we know today emerged: the 
World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF). Even though the Bretton 
Woods system eventually ended in 1971, these organizations still live on, in the 
company of other important organizations as the World Trade Organization (WTO), 
the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) and the 
emergence of the European Union (EU).  
Organizations like the World Bank, IMF, WTO, OECD and the EU are all 
implementing the earlier mentioned central features of economic globalization. All 
these organizations are promoting liberalization and internationalization to a more or 
less strong degree, but it is perhaps the IMF, WTO and the World Bank that are the 
champions of liberalization with their focus on reducing trade barriers and 
implementing liberal economic policies. Organizations like the World Bank, IMF and 
WTO have helped earlier developing nations like India and China in becoming some 
of the largest economies in the world. For instance, China’s growth rate has more than 
doubled since the early 1980s – from 1.5 per cent per capita to 3.7 per cent (Rodrik 
1997).  
 14 
2.2.2 The Effects of Globalization: Rich versus Poor  
Rodrik (2011) argues that it is far better to be poor in a rich country, than rich in a 
poor country (without taking relative deprivation into account), because the top decile 
with highest income in a poor country make much less than what poor people in rich 
countries earn.  In other words, he argues that inequality across different nations is 
large. This causes quite a conundrum, seeing as globalization would minimize these 
disparities by giving people access to markets, capital and technology. Over the last 
two centuries the world has experienced increased globalization, but also, according 
to Rodrik (2011), a massive economic divergence on a global scale.  
This growing global inequality has led to a complex debate between different 
economists, policy makers and other scholars. In order to present this debate in a 
perspicuous way it has to be simplified. It is important to be aware of that there are 
several different positions in this debate (Held and McGrew 2002: 99). To the 
purpose of this thesis I will focus on the views of the more extreme groups within the 
pro-globalization and anti-globalization camps, namely neoliberals and traditionalists 
(Held and McGrew 2002).  
Neoliberals see globalization as a solution to the growing challenge of 
inequality (Rodrik 2011). They argue that globalization should be led by the market 
forces, and that governments and organizations should not create barriers that will 
hinder prosperity (Scholte 2005). To increase economic growth states should open up 
to the global economy, not seek to protect itself from it.  
The opposing view of anti-globalizers is often named traditionalists (Scholte 
2005) or just radicals (Held and McGrew 2002). The traditionalists want to “de-
globalize” the world society because of the destruction globalization has caused over 
the last centuries. They see globalization as harmful, and argue that the so-called “de-
globalization” will help the world society recover from the growing inequality 
(Scholte 2005).  
Despite that the traditionalists are the radicals of the anti-globalization 
position there is some hold to their arguments. There is evidence that globalization 
does not work the way that the neoliberals argues that it does. The well-known and 
much-discussed North-South divide has been enhanced by the effect of globalization 
(Scholte 2005). Citizens of countries that are members of organizations as OECD and 
NATO have several structural advantages over citizens that are not in these exclusive 
clubs (Scholte 2005). However, there are of course poor people in the rich developed 
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countries, and rich élites in the poor, developing nations. The main problem here is 
that contemporary globalization has intensified these hierarchies as well as those 
between countries. Skilled individuals, who are characterized as people with 
education, knowledge and skills, have better chances at participating in the prosperity 
caused by globalization. Less skilled individuals have to a larger degree suffered from 
this. And because class-based inequalities in educational opportunities have tended to 
increase (Scholte 2005), this becomes a vicious circle. On the other hand, 
globalization increases prosperity – for those who already prosper from it. The world 
is witnessing a globalization of prosperity for the countries and individuals that are 
globalization winners, but a globalization of poverty for the countries and individuals 
that are globalization losers.  
Anti-globalization protesters have managed to change the terms of the 
globalization debate from revolving around the rich countries in the West’s 
prosperity, to revolve around the world’s developing countries, poverty alleviation 
and sustainable development (Rodrik 2007). Because the perhaps most important 
feature of globalization is that it does not affect countries in the same way - and the 
differences between the effects of globalization in rich and poor countries are large. 
Buckman (2004) argues that the difference in income per head between a rich 
industrial nation, as for instance Switzerland, and a poor non-industrial country, as for 
instance Mozambique, is about 400 to one. He also notes that in 2004 around 1.2 
billion people live on US$ 1 or less per day, and that about 2.8 billion people live on 
US$ 2 or less per day (Buckman 2004: 71).  
Globalization proponents argue that since the number of people living on US$ 
1 or less per day has been relatively stable over the last few years, there has been a 
reduction of poverty, if we take the world’s population growth into account (Buckman 
2004). But within developing countries the benefits they gain from economic 
globalization is often spread unevenly between the citizens. Buckman (2004: 70) 
highlights among others China, where only a quarter of its population has gained 
something from the big export boom, Mexico, where half of the population still lives 
in poverty despite an enormous increase in the country’s export since 1994, and 
Nigeria, which has exported oil worth US$ 300 billion over the last two decades, yet 
two-thirds of the citizens live on less than US$ 1 per day. This seems to give support 
to the anti-globalization movement’s reformulation of the boat-argument of their 
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opponents – economic globalization is not a rising tide that lifts all boats, it only lifts 
all yachts.  
Over the past two centuries the world has experienced a large concentration of 
the global manufacturing activity and the global flows of trade and capital in the rich 
countries of Western Europe, East Asia and North America. In 2000 the high-income 
countries of the world exported 73 per cent of the world’s exports and imported 75 
per cent of the world’s imports (Buckman 2004). When we know that these high-
income countries only account for 16 per cent of the world’s population, the effects of 
economic globalization seems unjust.  
The transnational companies (TNCs) of the world are vital proponents of 
economic globalization. These co-operations control most of the investment, trade, 
and employment decisions in the global economy. TNCs operate across borders and 
are often situated in several countries at once. With the new reduced trade- and 
investment barriers they have gained new markets and possibilities for what seems 
like limitless expansion. In 1970 there were only 7000 TNCs, but by 1997 the number 
had grown to 53 000 companies with overseas investments valued up to US$ 3500 
billion (Buckman 2004). By 2004 500 TNCs controlled around 80 per cent of the 
foreign investment in the world, and 30 per cent of the global output (Buckman 
2004).  
The numbers presented above would have caused less concern if we did not 
know that these companies are a creation of the rich parts of the world. Their 
workforce is global, but the owners and managers of most TNCs are situated in high-
income countries. Out of the 100 largest TNCs in 2004, 38 of them had headquarters 
in Western Europe, 29 in the US and 16 in Japan. Only 29 of them had headquarters 
in poor countries. Because of their wealth and power, TNCs have a dominant 
influence over economic globalization politics and the global trade. They also have a 
large influence over trade in the world’s raw materials, which often is situated in 
developing nations (Buckman 2004).  When we add that there is little regulation of 
TNCs at the international level, these numbers show that the developing countries of 
the world seem to have little or nothing to gain from these companies and their 
income other than low salaries and exploitation. 
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2.3 Globalization and Welfare Attitudes 
There are several studies that focus on globalization as a macro factor when studying 
effects on welfare attitudes. The relationship between increasing internationalization 
of production and provision of social security has been debated in the literature. Much 
of the research on this topic focuses on how globalization influences for instance 
government spending, as a measure of social security. On the other hand, few studies 
focus on the influence of globalization on the individual level. Another distinguishing 
feature is that much of the literature revolves around either European or OECD-
countries, or just one country as a sample. This leads to a gap in the research field, 
where countries outside the rich and powerful West are excluded. As mentioned 
earlier I attempt to countribute in filling this gap with this thesis. 
Rational choice theory emphasize the individuals’ own interests as an 
important factor in determining their political choice. Downs (1957) argues that a 
voter will compare the advantages of having one political party (or alliance) in 
government against the other alternatives. The voter will vote for the alternative that 
maximizes his or hers utility. In other words, rational choice theory argues that self-
interest is central in forming people’s attitudes.  
Neoliberals argue that globalization leads to prosperity and economic growth 
(Scholte 2005). By taking this argument into account, economic globalization may 
cause an increase in the citizens’ standard of living.  When citizens experience this 
economic prosperity they may change their attitudes from being proponents of an 
extensive welfare state, to want less government responsibility and redistribution, 
because they now have become contributors to the welfare state rather than 
beneficiaries. Thus, the first hypothesis of this thesis appears: 
 
H1: Increased economic globalization leads to rightist welfare attitudes among 
citizens 
2.3.1 Comparative Advantages: Ricardo and Heckscher-Ohlin 
As discussed above, there are striking differences between the effect of economic 
globalization in developed and developing nations. It seems as though the rich, 
developed countries, which are integrated in the world economy, reap the harvest 
from economic globalization, while the developing nations gain much less.  
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According to Rodrik (2011: 252), the restrictions that governments impose on 
international trade today have been reduced to the lowest levels the world has ever 
seen, and he argues that “protectionism” now has become a dirty word. Protectionism 
is a concept that describe governments’ actions towards protection its own 
production. These trade barriers can be related to tariffs, or related to restricting 
quotas, strong technical standards, anti-dumping initiatives, or subsidizing local firms 
and companies (NUPI 2013).  
Developing nations often suffer from lacking sufficient funding, institutions 
and placement in the global economy to be able to create economic growth. With 
most of them being labour-intensive countries it is hard for them to gain a place in the 
global economy long enough to build themselves up from the post-colonial ashes. 
Therefore, the more moderate school of the anti-globalization movement, which 
Buckman (2004) calls the Fair Trade School, argues that the rules have to be bent in 
favour of the developing nations, which can include the use of tariffs and 
protectionism to protect their local agricultural industries (Buckman 2004). With the 
use of a certain amount of protectionism it is easier to imagine that a developing 
country can experience economic growth, and in time be able to compete in the global 
economy. 
Economic models of voting argue that voters assess the economy of their 
country, by looking at different economic indices, such as GDP growth rate and their 
personal economy. Their attitudes towards the nation’s or their own economy will 
affect the way they vote (Lewis-Beck and Stegmaier 2007). Thus, it is also plausible 
that the state of the economy affects people’s attitudes towards welfare. Assuming the 
neoliberal argument that an increase in economic globalization in a country will 
create some higher level of economic development and growth (Scholte 2005), it is 
likely that citizens (who experience increased standards of living) will be less 
supportive of redistribution and a large degree of government responsibility because 
they do not benefit from it, according to the self-interest based rational-choice theory 
(Downs 1957). 
The theory of comparative advantage originated with from the British 
economist David Ricardo (1772–1823). The assumptions of this theory are that the 
factors of production are immovable between countries, while the products they 
produce are mobile. If every country specializes its production and use some of it for 
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export – which in turn finances the import of goods from other countries – these 
countries are able to utilize their advantages in the international trade system (Sandmo 
2006: 75). The comparative advantage theory essentially demonstrates that all 
countries could benefit economically from specializing in producing the items in 
which they have a relative cost advantage, and then trading with another country with 
those items (Stilwell 2006).  
A frequently used example of Ricardo’s theory is Great Britain and Portugal’s 
production of wine and clothing. The assumed number of man-labour years used to 
produce the wine and clothing are as follows: 
 
 Great Britain Portugal 
Wine 120 80 
Clothing 100 90 
 
As we can see, Portugal is producing both goods more effectively than Great Britain. 
However, for Portugal it would be rewarding to specialize in wine production and let 
Great Britain produce clothes, since trade with wine for clothing would give more 
clothing than if the country had produced it on its own (Sandmo 2006: 76).  
Building on Ricardo’s theory the Swedish economists Eli Heckscher and 
Bertil Ohlin created the Heckscher-Ohlin (H–O) model, which is a general 
equilibrium model of international trade. The baseline of the H–O model is that 
countries will export products that are easy and cheap for them to produce, and import 
the products that would have been harder and more expensive to produce, because of 
for instance scarce factors (Ohlin 2004 [1924]).  
Drawing on Ricardo’s theory of comparative advantage, the H–O model and 
rational choice theory, I assume that there might be a shift in attitudes after a certain 
degree of economic globalization, towards a more rightist view. In other words, when 
a country achieves a certain level of economic globalization the citizens will no 
longer see the need for an extensive welfare state, and they will develop attitudes that 
correspond with more individualistic attitudes, based on self-interest as they realize 
that their country is successful in the global market competition. This shift in attitudes 
is described graphically in Figure 2.1 below, and creates the basis of the second 
hypothesis of this thesis:  
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H2: After a country reaches a certain level of competitiveness, the effect of economic 
globalization on welfare attitudes will shift from leftist to rightist 
 
Figure 2.1 – Rightist Shift in Welfare Attitudes 
 
 
2.3.2 The Compensation Hypothesis 
In the midst of the literature on globalization’s effect on public opinion we find the 
compensation hypothesis. This states that globalization leads to welfare state 
expansion, because governments will try to compensate the citizens that are 
vulnerable to the risks associated with increased international competition and 
volatility (Walter 2010: 403). The compensation hypothesis has both a demand- and 
supply side component. On the demand side are the public in different countries 
demanding either more welfare benefits or not, depending on their welfare attitudes. 
On the supply side are the governments of the respective countries, who may or may 
not be able to meet the demands of the public. The different studies analyzing the 
compensation hypothesis usually focus on just one of these components (Walter 
2010).  
Supporting the compensation hypothesis, Cameron (1978) studied 18 OECD 
countries in the time frame of 1960–1975 and found that more open economies have 
features that cause higher demands for government transfers like social security, 
pensions, unemployment benefits, and so on. Ruggie (1982) presented the 
 21 
“compromise of embedded liberalism” that, in short, explains how the international 
economic liberalism after World War II gave the welfare state a central role.  
Three years later, Katzenstein (1985) found that governments in small 
European states like Sweden and Austria have responded to insecurities from 
increased globalization with higher government involvement. A more recent 
contribution is Rodrik (1998), who found proof for the compensation hypothesis 
when investigating degree of openness and size of public sector in over 100 countries 
from all over the world. He found that when risks caused by international trade is 
highest, the relationship between openness and government size is at its strongest 
(Rodrik 1998).  
Cameron (1978), Ruggie (1982), Katzenstein (1985) and Rodrik (1998) have 
found the compensation hypothesis to be valid, but other scholars have doubted the 
effect of globalization on welfare state expansion. These sceptics can be separated by 
the demand and supply components of the compensation hypothesis. Rodrik (1997), 
for instance, focuses on the supply-side and argues that countries with high levels of 
terms-of-trade volatility experience expanded spending, while countries with low 
levels of terms-of-trade volatility experience, like the OECD-countries, experience 
reduced spending because the economic risks are not as high here as in countries that 
are less integrated and plays a smaller role in the world economy.  
Other sceptics challenge the demand side, like Iversen and Cusack (2000). 
While investigating the causes of welfare state expansion they argue that it is actually 
the changes in the national labour market in different countries that creates the 
biggest economic risks – not globalization. Rehm (2009) investigates the effects of 
globalization at the individual level, and finds that risks at the occupational level of 
the labour market are more important than the risks at the industry level. In other 
words, both Rehm (2009) and Iversen and Cusack (2000) challenge the compensation 
hypothesis on a fundamental level, arguing that it is the local factors – not the global 
ones – that create the biggest economic risks that public opinion take into account. 
Several authors find support for the hypothesis empirically. As mentioned 
earlier Rodrik (1998) found that the public sector is largest in countries that are highly 
integrated in the world economy. Hicks and Swank (1992) found that economic 
openness correlates with higher degrees of welfare spending in their analysis of 18 
capitalist democracies during the 1960–82 period. Bernauer and Achini (2000: 254) 
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argue that openness to international trade “…goes hand in hand with a larger size of 
public sector”. Garrett and Mitchell (2001) find that countries with greater shares of 
foreign direct investment is associated with more progressive taxation, despite their 
doubts regarding the compensation hypothesis.  
Yet other scholars have challenged the proponents of the compensation 
hypothesis mentioned above. In his study of OECD-countries Down (2007) finds that 
the level of insecurity in developed countries have been driven by economic 
globalization, but that the international trade integration may have eased the domestic 
economic volatility. Kim (2007) questions the causal mechanisms behind the 
openness-volatility link in the compensation hypothesis. In is panel analysis of 175 
countries in the period between 1950–2002 he finds an effect of external risk on 
volatility of the major economic aggregates, but also an insignificant effect of 
openness (Kim 2007).  
Garrett (2001) finds no proof for that capital mobility, or rapid growth of 
capital mobility, has an impact on government spending in his analysis of countries 
from all over the world in the periods between 1970–1984 and 1985–1995. However, 
there is evidence that indicate that high levels of trade can be associated with high 
levels of government spending, but that countries with a higher growth rate of trade 
experienced slower growth of government spending (Garrett 2001).  
Genschel (2001) finds that tax constraints prevent governments from raising 
their taxes in response to the economic insecurity caused by economic globalization, 
and argue that openness have a negative impact on public spending. Another study 
that supports this claim is that of Busemeyer (2009), who finds that economic 
openness has a negative impact on public spending in OECD countries. He argues 
that this has not been found before, because earlier studies have focused on a “…time 
period in which globalization effects have not played out yet”, or because they have 
“…emphasized the cross-sectional rather than the over-time dimension” (Busemeyer 
2009: 456).  
Some authors have taken a more neutral position in this debate, arguing for a 
more nuanced understanding of the relationship between economic openness and 
government spending. Adserà and Boix (2002) found that much of the literature on 
this topic neglects political effects on different tariff regimes in their analyses, and in 
turn the growth of the public sector is regarded as a functional response to the 
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requirements of trade.  In his analysis of 18 OECD-countries Burgoon (2001) find 
that it is the import competition from developing countries, rather than the general 
trade openness that creates demands for welfare compensation. He also notes that 
groups that are more vulnerable to these risks will not demand more general welfare 
goods, but demand public spending in terms of active and passive labour market 
policies. Swank and Steinmo (2002) argues that capital mobility and trade are 
associated with lower tax rates, but not with reductions in effective average tax rates 
on capital income. They also find that domestic structural unemployment causes 
reductions in labour and capital taxes, while public sector debt raise taxes (Swank and 
Steinmo 2002). As we can see, Adserà and Boix (2002), Burgoon (2001) and Swank 
and Steinmo (2002) argue that there are other factors to consider while analyzing 
openness and government spending.  
Walter (2010) criticizes the authors mentioned above for only focusing on 
certain parts of the causal chain from openness to government spending. She presents 
a test of the compensation hypothesis’ micro-foundations, and uses different 
indicators for measuring individuals’ positions as globalization “winners” or “losers”. 
Further, she tests the causal mechanism of the compensation hypothesis, and argues 
that it consists of several links between the individuals’ position in the global 
economy, perceptions of risk and policy preferences. 
 
 
Figure 2.2 - Globalization and Welfare State Expansion: The Causal Chain (Walter 2010) 
 
 
 
The first causal link is between the individual’s position in the globalized economy 
and its feelings of economic insecurity. For example if a citizen in a highly globalized 
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country is worried about losing his job because of his employer’s outsourcing. The 
second link is between the individual’s feelings of economic insecurity and policy 
preferences for more social protection. An example here is that the citizen’s insecurity 
leads him to want more social protection in form of social welfare. The third link is 
between the individual’s preference for social protection, and a preference for leftist 
political parties in government. An example here is if the citizen decides to vote for a 
political party at the left end of the scale to achieve his wish for more social 
protection. The preference for more leftist political parties might in turn lead to an 
expansion of the welfare state. These three links show a causal relationship between 
public opinion and the expansion of the welfare state. 
Walter (2010) uses Switzerland as a sample to see if the compensation 
hypothesis can be observed empirically. She finds support for the causal logic of the 
compensation argument, and strong evidence for the direct links, which she argues 
that implies that a country’s exposure to globalization increases individual job 
security, which in turn enhances preferences for welfare state expansion, and these 
preferences are positively related to partisan preferences for the Left. Thus, the third 
hypothesis of this thesis appears: 
 
H3: Increased economic globalization leads to leftist welfare attitudes among citizens 
 
This hypothesis is not the same as the compensation hypothesis. In my thesis I only 
test one of the causal links that Walter (2010) presents as the causal chain of the 
compensation argument; the link between the individual effect of globalization and 
demands for compensation. Implicit in this hypothesis is the fact that economic 
globalization can create economic insecurity, especially for the individuals 
characterized as globalization losers. The demand for compensation is assumed to be 
higher for this group than for globalization winners, who benefit from the effects of a 
more global economy.   
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2.3.3 Differences in Welfare Attitudes 
As noted earlier, the main argument of the compensation hypothesis is that 
globalization will lead to expansion of the welfare state because of the risks 
associated with integration in the global economy. The idea behind this argument is 
that the welfare state will function as a safety net against external risk. Following 
Walter’s (2010) causal chain the fourth hypothesis of this thesis is:  
 
H4: Individuals in developing countries will have more leftist welfare attitudes than 
individuals living in developed countries  
 
This hypothesis is based on the assumption that because citizens in developing 
nations in general have less education and job security than citizens in developed 
countries, and often tend be typical globalization losers, they will want more support 
and welfare benefits from the state to protect them from the external risks that come 
with increased economic globalization. As mentioned earlier, anti-globalizers argue 
that economic globalization have different effects in developing and developed 
countries. Their argument is based on the fact that globalisation creates prosperity for 
those countries that already prosper from it, while developing countries to not gain as 
much.  
By comparing the mean of ECONOMIC GLOBALIZATION for developed and 
developing countries we are able to see an indication of how economic globalization 
might affect welfare attitudes differently in the different countries. Figure 2.3 and 2.4 
demonstrate that the developed nations have typically higher levels of economic 
globalization than the developing nations, which indicate that these developing 
countries are not fully integrated in the global market. In Figure 2.3 the mean value of 
ECONOMIC GLOBALIZATION is presented, and it shows us that countries like 
Luxemburg, Belgium and Netherlands have high levels of economic globalization, at 
a mean score of round 90 on the scale ranging from 0–100.  Almost all of the 
developed countries in this sample have a mean score of over 40 on the same scale.  
Figure 2.4 indicates that this is not the case for the developing countries of this 
sample. Only four of these states have a mean score of 60 or above. Most of them 
have a mean score of over 30, but there are exceptions like Rwanda, Bangladesh and 
Tanzania that score under 30 on this scale.  
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Figure 2.3 - Mean of ECONOMIC GLOBALIZATION for Developed Countries 
 
 
 
Figure 2.4 - Mean of ECONOMIC GLOBALIZATION for Developing Countries 
 
 
Figure 2.5 - Mean of GOVERNMENT RESPONSIBILITY for Developed Countries 
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Figure 2.6 - Mean score of GOVERNMENT RESPONSIBILITY for Developing Countries 
 
 
At the same time, we can see from Figures 2.5 and 2.6 that there is also a difference in 
attitudes between developing and developed nations. Figure 2.5 shows that there 
seems to be lower mean scores for developed countries, than the mean scores for 
developing countries, as shown in Figure 2.6. Developed nations like Luxemburg, 
Belgium and Netherlands, who also had high levels of economic globalization, have 
low mean scores on GOVERNMENT RESPONSIBILITY, indicating that citizens in these 
countries prefer a less extensive welfare state where the government takes less 
responsibility for individuals.   
For the developing countries, presented in Figure 2.6, only three countries 
have mean scores below 5. Developing nations, as for instance Jordan, Kyrgystan and 
South Africa, who had high levels of economic globalization, have high mean scores 
on GOVERNMENT RESPONSIBILITY, indicating that citizens in these countries have a 
preference for a bigger welfare state where the government have more responsibility 
for social services. 
These mean scores do not show how, or even if, economic globalization 
affects the public attitudes towards how much responsibility the state should have, but 
indicates that there is a difference in the effect of economic globalization on welfare 
attitudes between developed and developing countries. This argument is tested by the 
fifth hypothesis in this thesis: 
 
H5: Economic globalization leads to leftist welfare attitudes for citizens in developing 
nations, and rightist welfare attitudes for citizens in developed nations 
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2.3.4 Globalization winners and globalization losers 
The terms globalization winners and globalization losers are inspired by Walter’s 
(2010) distinction using economic terms. She argues that this is a central concept of 
the compensation argument, and draws on both sectoral and factoral approaches to 
classify the winners and losers of globalization. Sectoral models emphasize how 
globalization can pose an existential threat to individuals’ jobs and wages, while 
factoral models stresses the importance of education and skills.  
She argues that high-skilled individuals working in exposed sectors in 
developed countries can be identified as globalization winners, because they are in a 
position to sell their skills to global markets. Low-skilled individuals in a developed 
country on the other hand, are more exposed to risk since the goods they produce can 
easily be replaced with imported goods from low-wage countries. In other words, 
globalization has a more negative effect on low-skilled individuals and a more 
positive effect on high-skilled individuals (Walter 2010). This can also be true for 
individuals in developing nations, but in these countries the strength of the effect will 
perhaps not be the same as for high-income countries.  
Walter (2010) notes that globalization losers feel more insecure than 
globalization winners, and that they demand more social protection, and they are 
more likely to vote for the left-oriented parties. In countries with high degrees of 
economic globalization the levels of insecurity will be higher. Globalization winners 
might gain from this economic globalization, because their skills are saleable on the 
global market. Globalization losers however, will suffer because they can easily be 
replaced with labour from countries where wages are lower. Following the argument 
of globalization winners and losers, the two last hypothesis of this paper is: 
 
H6: Globalization losers have more leftist welfare attitudes than globalization 
winners 
 
H7: The difference between globalization winners and losers will be largest in 
countries with a high degree of economic globalization  
 
In this paper I identify globalization winners and losers by using education as a 
measure of skill-level. Thus, I am using a factoral approach to this identification. A 
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better measure could be created of both sectoral and factoral approaches, but for the 
purpose of this paper and the data I am using this has proven to be a difficult task.  
Walter (2010) used an Offshore Ability Index to compare the different sectors 
of employment in her data from Switzerland. An attempt to do this in this case would 
provide an inaccurate measure, since the Offshore Ability Index and the employment 
sector-variable in the WVS are not 100 per cent compatible. It also proved to be 
difficult because of time limitations. A factoral measure of education is therefore 
considered as the best possible alternative. A more lengthy discussion of this measure 
will be presented in chapter 3. The hypotheses regarding globalization winners and 
losers will be investigated using a cross-level interaction of education at the 
individual level and economic globalization at the country-year level.  
To sum up, I will repeat the seven hypotheses presented in this chapter. These 
are presented in the Table 1: 
 
Table 2.1 - Summary of the Hypotheses 
H1: Increased economic globalization leads to rightist welfare attitudes among citizens 
 
H2: After a country reaches a certain level of competitiveness, the effect of economic globalization on 
welfare attitudes will shift from leftist to rightist 
 
H3: Increased economic globalization leads to leftist welfare attitudes among citizens 
 
H4: Individuals in developing countries will have more leftist welfare attitudes than individuals living 
in developed countries  
 
H5: Economic globalization leads to leftist welfare attitudes for citizens in developing nations, and 
rightist welfare attitudes for citizens in developed nations 
 
H6: Globalization losers have more leftist welfare attitudes than globalization winners 
 
H7: The difference between globalization winners and losers will be largest in countries with a high 
degree of economic globalization  
 
 
To test for these hypotheses I will use multilevel analysis. By using this method of 
analysis I am able to test for both individual and contextual factors. As earlier noted, 
economic globalization is the most important contextual variable in this analysis. As 
Walter (2010) and Finseraas and Ringdal (2012) have found evidence for, economic 
globalization creates certain levels of insecurity for individuals. However, I argue that 
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this depends on both individual and contextual factors that affect the individual, such 
as skill level, measured by HIGH EDUCATION, and the economic situation in the 
individual’s country of residence, measured by GDP PC. The level of insecurity that the 
individual experiences will thus affect his or her demand for compensation in terms of 
attitudes towards welfare, here measured by GOVERNMENT RESPONSIBILITY. These 
assumptions are presented as a theoretical model in Figure 7 below1.  
 
Figure 2.7 - Theoretical Model 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
1 The individual level of insecurity is added in this model although I do not test for this specifically in 
my analysis. I rely on Walter’s (2010) test of the causal mechanism embedded in the compensation 
argument, which assumes that economic globalization creates insecurity for individuals, and that it is 
this that affect the individuals degree of demand for compensation.  
Individual skill 
level 
Economic 
Globalization 
Economic 
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3 Research Design and Data 
 
I employ multilevel modelling to get a global assessment of how economic 
globalization affects the public’s attitudes towards welfare. To achieve this I use data 
from more than 350.000 respondents from over 90 countries in different parts of the 
world. In this chapter I will first briefly discuss the methodological basis for the 
statistical method.  After this follows a presentation of the data used in this thesis and 
an elaboration of the multilevel method of analysis and its assumptions. I will also 
discuss the limitations to the analysis used in this thesis, before lastly, I present the 
dependent and independents variables.  
 
3.1 Methodology 
Scientists have always disagreed on some fundamental issues, as for instance how we 
understand the nature of the world we study. Moses and Knutsen (2007) argue that 
this ultimately has to do with different ways of knowing, or in other words, 
methodological differences. They introduce the three musketeers of metaphysics as 
ontology, epistemology and methodology. Ontology can be identified as the study of 
being, with the central question here being “what is the world made of?” 
Epistemology on the other hand, is characterized as the philosophical study of 
knowledge; while methodology represents the different ways we acquire this 
knowledge (Moses and Knutsen 2007; Hay 2002). All three terms are quite abstract, 
but nevertheless important for social scientists as they help us understand the different 
ways in which we do research.  
Moses and Knutsen (2007) argue that no method of research is self-validating 
– its status as a research instrument is dependent on epistemological justifications, and 
they group most work in social science into two broad methodological categories that 
are radically different: positivism2 and constructivism. My thesis places itself in the 
positivist category due to the belief in a measurable world that exists independent of 
our perceptions of it. An important assumption in the positivist tradition is that there 
exists a real world out there, which we are able to gain access to by thinking, 
                                                
2 Moses and Knutsen (2007) employ the term naturalism to describe this methodological tradition. 
However, I chose the more common term of positivism, which refers to the philosophical positions that 
emphasize empirical data and scientific methods. 
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observing and recording our experiences carefully. These methods help us reveal 
patterns that exist in nature, independent of our experience of it.  
 
3.1.1 The Statistical Method 
Positivistic social scientists agree that their task is to identify patterns and regularities 
in nature. The most ideal method to do this is by experimental design. However, in 
social science it is not always easy to conduct experiments. Therefore, many social 
scientists have adopted what has proven to be the next best choice: statistical 
analysis. According to Moses and Knutsen (2007) there are two main ways in which 
statistical methods can be used in the positivistic tradition: descriptive and inferential. 
This paper uses the method of inferential statistics to investigate the relationship 
between globalization and public opinion in different parts of the world. In the spirit 
of King, Keohane and Verba (1994: 8) this paper will use multilevel analysis to try to 
make inferences that go beyond the particular observations that can be collected.  
 
3.2 Sample 
The data used in this paper on the individual level (level-1) comes from four waves3 
of the World Values Survey (WVS) (World Values Survey 2012). The four surveys 
use the same questionnaire and methodology. The data I have used consists in total of 
over 350 000 respondents from over 90 countries. The WVS is a non-profit 
organization, which gathers information concerning changes that are taking place in 
the beliefs, values and motivations of people throughout the world. The data used in 
this paper is made available through the WVS website4. At the country year level 
(level-2) I have four continuous variables: ECONOMIC GLOBALIZATION, GINI and GDP, 
from the KOF Index of Globalization (Dreher et al. 2008), SWIID (Solte 2009) and 
the World Bank (2012) respectively. Neither the WVS nor any of the other data 
sources are responsible for the analysis and interpretation I make in this paper.  
The multilevel analysis in this thesis has three levels: individual level, 
country-year level and country level. The individual level data consists of samples of 
the population from different countries, while the country-year and country level data 
                                                
3 Wave 2 = 1989–1993, Wave 3= 1994–1999, Wave 4 =1999–2004, Wave 5 = 2005–2007  
4 www.worldvaluessurvey.com 
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consists of data from different states and from several different time points. Thus, the 
country-year and country level data consists of data that borders on the population as 
a whole. Here, stochastic model theory is useful. Within this theory, we are able to 
generalize from the observations we find, to the mechanism that generates the data 
(Aaberge and Laake 1984: 185). At the individual level I use samples of the 
population within different countries. Sample theory allows me to generalize from the 
sample at the individual level to the population the sample is selected from.  
 
3.3 Multilevel Analysis 
As mentioned earlier, my choice of method is multilevel analysis to investigate how 
globalization influences the public opinion’s attitudes towards welfare. The data used 
in this analysis is hierarchically structured in three levels, which means that the units 
at the individual level are regarded as nested within units at the country-year level, 
and the units at this level are nested in units at the country-level. When using 
multilevel analysis I am able to account for the variance in the dependent variable 
measured at the lowest level by taking the higher levels into consideration 
(Steenbergen and Jones 2002: 219). This means that the observations at the lowest 
level are influenced by the higher levels. In other words, there is no statistical 
independency in the observations.  
The most important reason for using multilevel analysis is a substantial one. I 
am mainly interested in the effects of variables at the second level of my analysis, 
more specifically the effect of globalization. By using another method of analysis I 
would not be able to measure these effects in a satisfactory way. Another important 
reason for choosing this method of analysis is that the data I am using is hierarchically 
structured. Ignoring this structure in the data is characterized as naïve pooling. By 
using for example Ordinary Least Squares regression on this type of data, I would 
violate the assumption of statistical independency, which would lead to inaccurate 
estimation of the regression coefficients and underestimated standard errors (Strabac 
2007: 174). This would most likely cause me to commit type I-errors, which means to 
incorrectly dismiss the null hypothesis (Ringdal 2012).  
There are two different types of multilevel analysis: random intercept models 
and random slope models. In this paper I employ a random intercept model. This 
method assumes that the effects of the different variables are the same in each unit of 
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analysis, but that the intercept for the different level-2 and level-3 units will vary. In 
this case I assume that the effect of economic globalization is the same in all 
countries, but that their baseline is different. There is reason to believe that the effect 
of economic globalization is different in different countries, as I already have 
hypothesized. Random slope modelling opens up possibilities for different effects of 
variables, in addition to different intercepts. However, this is a more complicated 
method that is harder to interpret, especially since I have 151 units at level 2. Because 
of this I argue that random intercept modelling is a more preferable method of 
analysis in this case.  
 
3.3.1 Assumptions of Multilevel Analysis 
Multilevel analysis has some assumptions that need to be fulfilled to ensure that the 
modelling is correct. First of all, according to Ringdal (no date) the Intra Class 
Correlation Coefficient (ICC)5 of the baseline model is supposed to be above 5 per 
cent to justify the use of multilevel analysis. However, it is important to emphasize 
that this is not a substantial rule; it functions more as a guideline. The hierarchical 
structure of the data is more important in justifying the use of multilevel analysis. 
Since the data of this analysis is hierarchically structured, this justifies the use of 
multilevel analysis. In addition to this, the ICC of both the country-year and country 
level in the baseline model of this analysis is above 5 per cent.  
Hox (2010) argues that there should be at least 30 units at level-2 to ensure 
satisfactory results in multilevel analysis. If one is to employ cross level interactions 
the number of units should be somewhat higher, around 50 units. The demand for a 
certain number of units is important, as higher sample sizes makes estimates and their 
standard errors more accurate (Hox 2010). In this analysis there are 151 units at level 
the second level of analysis, in which all contextual variables are admitted. This 
ensures that the results of the analysis are not biased due to a small sample. 
The dependent variable should be normally distributed. If this is not the case, 
one should consider using robust standard errors. This requires 100 or more units at 
the highest level of analysis. On the other hand, if one already has a large sample like 
                                                
5 The ICC is calculated from the variance of the residuals at the different levels of analysis, and show 
us how much variance is to be found at the different levels. It can be calculated in the following way 
for the level-2 variance: ICC = su2/ (se2 + su20 + sv20). And for the level-3 variance: ICC = sv20/ (se2 + su20 
+ sv20).  
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this, normal distribution is not a significant issue, due to the central limit theorem that 
states that as our sample size becomes larger, the sampling distribution of the mean 
becomes approximately normal regardless of the shape of the variable’s frequency 
distribution (Hamilton 1992: 27). 
Multicollinearity can be a problem in multilevel modelling (Hox 2010). If two 
or more variables correlate too much, the standard errors of these will increase, and 
thus affect their statistical significance. However, I have tested for multicollinearity, 
and the value of tolerance demonstrates that this is not a problem (see Table A2 in 
appendix). 
The most important assumption in multilevel analysis, and probably the most 
difficult to fulfil, is the assumption that all relevant variables should be included in the 
analysis, and that all irrelevant variables should be excluded. This is a hard 
assumption to fulfil with all types of regression, but especially with multilevel 
analysis due to the few units at the higher levels of analysis that prevent us from 
controlling for an infinite number of variables here. Yet nonetheless, I have included 
the variables that I find most relevant with basis in theory and previous research on 
this topic.  
 
3.4 Limitations to the Analysis  
A problem when doing quantitative research is causality. A regression analysis can 
only tell us if different variables are correlated, not how they are causally linked. 
Because of this, it is important to base quantitative research on a solid theoretical 
framework (Elster 1989; Bay 2000). In this case I rely in general on the theories and 
previous research that is discussed above, but especially on Walter (2010), who has 
tested the causal chain of the effect of globalization on individuals’ attitudes, and 
found that the individual is influenced by the consequences of globalization – not the 
other way around.  
Another limitation that is relevant for this paper is the question of whether we 
are comparing the same in all of the countries in the survey. In other words, this 
concerns the validity of the measures that are used in this analysis. A problem with 
validity can be triggered by, for instance, that words or concepts have different 
meanings in different countries. Yet, I have confidence in that the WVS, with its 
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experience in cross-cultural data collection, has solved this challenge in the best 
possible way.  
A more relevant issue to this thesis is that of cross-cultural comparability. The 
data used in this analysis consists of countries from all over the world, which makes it 
likely that the problem of cross-cultural comparability is present. An example of this 
is the individual level variable education, which I have coded into a dummy, where a 
high level of education gets the value 1, while a low level of education gets the value 
0. It is likely that what is considered as high and low education in different countries 
will vary, especially between developing and developed countries. In addition to this, 
there are differences in educational systems in different countries. This issue could 
have been addressed by using country-specific measures for education. However, 
with 78 different countries in the sample of the analysis, this would take up too many 
degrees of freedom. I have therefore chosen to employ an education variable that is 
not country-specific, but I am aware of this issue when interpreting the results.  
The sample used in this analysis consists of more developed countries than 
developing countries. It can be hard to collect data from developing countries, 
because of factors ranging from lack of interests in survey data and lack of resources 
and funding, to more serious factors as for instance that respondents fear that honest 
answers could lead to unfortunate consequences. No matter the reason, having an 
uneven sample can cause biased results on behalf of the developing countries. This 
issue is unfortunately very difficult to address, but is something that is important to be 
aware of when interpreting the results.  
The last limitations I will address are regarding the cross-sectional feature of 
the data used in this analysis. Individual attitudes are highly context-dependent, and 
when using cross-sectional data from over 90 countries the analysis may suffer from 
removing the data from its context. Especially since the sample includes both 
developing and developed countries. This challenge could be limited by analyzing 
respondents from only one or several similar countries, as much of the research on 
this topic have done (e.g. Ringdal and Finseraas 2012; Dallinger 2010; Walter 2010; 
Blekesaune and Quandagno 2003). This, on the other hand, would prevent me from 
investigating the differences in globalization exposure effects on individual policy 
preferences in different countries, which is one of the things that makes this analysis 
stand out from the previous research on this topic.  
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I acknowledge that including countries that are so different in the same sample can be 
problematic, seeing as there might be differences in what actually affects attitudes in 
these countries. This is an argument for analyzing developing and developed 
countries separately. But as the sample consists of more developed than developing 
countries, I am not able to control for the same number of variables in the analysis, 
because of fewer units at the highest level of analysis for developing countries. 
However, I distinguish between developing and developed countries by controlling 
for GDP PC and a standardized measure of the GINI Index, in addition to an interaction 
between GDP PC and ECONOMIC GLOBALIZATION.  
  
3.5 Dependent and Independent Variables 
3.5.1 The Dependent Variable  
The dependent variable in this analysis is GOVERNMENT RESPONSIBILITY. For 
descriptive statistics, see Table 3.1. Originally I wanted to create a scale out of three 
variables (INCOME INEQUALITY, PRIVATE VS STATE OWNERSHIP OF BUSINESS and 
GOVERNMENT RESPONSIBILITY) I assumed would measure welfare attitudes. A 
Principal Component Analysis (PCA) confirmed that these variables loaded on the 
same component (see Table A1 in appendix), but the results from the Cronbach’s 
Alpha test showed low internal reliability (.282).   
The results from these tests indicate that the variables do not measure the same 
underlying phenomenon. Instead of constructing a scale I therefore chose to use one 
of the variables: GOVERNMENT RESPONSIBILITY. A compromise like this may have 
unfortunate effects on the results of the analysis concerning validity. If a variable is 
valid it means that it is measuring exactly what we think it measures. In this case this 
would mean that GOVERNMENT RESPOSIBILITY is a measure of welfare attitudes.  
In the case of the dependent variable in this thesis, there is reason to believe 
that attitudes towards government responsibility only measure a part of the concept of 
welfare attitudes. By using GOVERNMENT RESPONSIBILITY as a dependent variable I 
measure people’s more general perception of what role the state should take, which is 
an important dimension of welfare attitudes, rather than measuring a specific aspect of 
social policy, like income redistribution or ownership of business.  
This could prove to have unfortunate results, as Kumlin (2007) argues that it is 
more difficult for people to assess their attitudes towards such a general concept, 
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rather than to reflect on their attitudes towards concrete questions as for instance what 
their attitudes regarding unemployment benefits. However, using a more specific 
measure like INCOME INEQUALITY or PRIVATE VS STATE OWNERSHIP OF BUSINESS 
would not be a more preferable alternative because this would reduce the concept of 
welfare state preferences to one specific issue. This has led me to the conclusion that 
even though using GOVERNMENT RESPONSIBILITY as a measure of welfare attitudes is 
unfortunate, it is assessed as the most practical alternative to using a scale.  
This variable captures the left-right dimension of welfare attitudes by making the 
respondents range from 1–10 if they think that the individual should take more 
responsibility to provide for themselves (1), or if the state should take more 
responsibility to provide for its inhabitants (10). Thus, low values on this variable 
indicate favourability towards a less extensive welfare state, while high values 
indicate that the respondent favour a more developed welfare state.  
The dependent variable is not perfectly normally distributed (see Figure A1 in 
appendix). This could have prevented me from using this variable in this analysis 
since it violates the assumption of normal distribution for multilevel analysis (Strabac 
2007). But because of the large sample of over 184 000 units in the analysis at the 
individual level it is not likely that this will have an effect on the results. The reason is 
that in a large sample size the sampling distribution of the mean will become 
approximately normal (Hamilton 1992: 27). Therefore I employ the dependent 
variable without making any changes to it.  
 
Table 3.1 - Descriptive Statistics for Dependent Variable  
  N Mean Std. dev. Minimum Maximum 
Government Responsibility 184 779 6.072 3.014 1 10 
 
3.5.2 Independent Variables at the Individual Level  
At the individual level I use several control variables: WOMEN (0–1), AGE (14–97), 
HIGH EDUCATION (0–1), INCOME (1–10), SOCAL TRUST (0–1), MARRIED (0–1) and 
EMPLOYED (0–1). For descriptive statistics on these variables, see Table 3.2. 
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Table 3.2 - Descriptive Statistics for Independent Variables at the Individual Level 
  N Mean Std. dev. Minimum Maximum 
Woman 184 779 0.511 0.499 0 1 
Age 184 779 41.133 15.978 15 99 
High Education 184 779 0.219 0.413 0 1 
Income 184 779 4.577 2.436 1 10 
Married 184 779 0.643 0.479 0 1 
Employed 184 779 0.545 0.498 0 1 
Social Trust 184 779 0.266 0.442 0 1 
 
 
The variable for gender, WOMAN, is recoded into a dummy where women have the 
value 1, and men are the reference category. The two variables MARRIED and 
EMPLOYED are also dummy variables, with people being married and having a job has 
the value 1, while the rest are codes as the reference category 0. These variables are 
all tended to proxy some level of risk, as I assume that individuals with a job 
experience less economic risk than individuals that are unemployed. I also assume 
that individuals that are married and living with their partner experience less 
economic risk than individuals in single person households. When it comes to gender 
differences, this can be related to family obligations, where women are known to take 
more responsibility for the extended family and more prone to develop attitudes that 
also favour others than themselves (Finseraas and Ringdal 2012). 
  The continuous variable AGE is measured in years, and varies from 14 to 97. 
The variable SOCIAL TRUST is a dummy created from the original dichotomous 
variable based on the question “Generally speaking, would you say that most people 
can be trusted or that you need to be very careful in dealing with people?” The value 
0 represents “Need to be very careful”, while the value 1 represents “Most people can 
be trusted”. SOCIAL TRUST is added to the analysis because of the assumption that 
individuals with more trust in other people will be more positive towards more 
redistribution of income and an extended welfare state, because they trust other 
people not to cheat.  
The variable HIGH EDUCATION is a dummy variable based on the original 
variable that measures highest education level attained, which ranges from 1–8, where 
1 represents those who have not completed elementary school and 8 represent those 
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who have achieved a university degree. This is a categorical variable that I chose to 
recode into a dummy for high education, where those who have attended university is 
coded as the value 1, while completing elementary and secondary school is the 
reference category. In this paper I use education as a proxy for individual skill-level, 
in the process of identifying globalization winners and losers. I assume that 
individuals with high education are more likely to gain from globalization, while 
individuals with lower levels of education are more likely to become globalization 
losers.  
As mentioned earlier, measuring education is problematic because of cross-
cultural comparability – i.e. a low education in Sweden may be regarded as a high 
education in Ghana. This makes it hard to identify which education group represents 
globalization losers and winners, especially when the variable is coded as a dummy 
for high education. It is possible that globalization winners in Ghana also include 
those individuals that have completed secondary school, not only those who have 
attended university. However, a dummy set for education would create problems with 
the interaction between economic globalization and education since I cannot have 
more than 7 variables at the country-year level due to the number of units at this level.  
The WVS does not supply a variable for individual income. The variable 
INCOME used in this analysis measures household income before taxes on a scale from 
1 to 10, where 1 represent the lowest income, and 10 represent the highest income. 
This measure is subjective, which means that it is the respondent that places himself 
in the different categories. This income variable is measured in deciles, which means 
that a respondent in the first decile thinks he is among the 10 per cent with lowest 
income in his or hers country.  Consequently, a respondent in the tenth decile thinks 
he is among the 10 per cent with highest income in his or her country.  
Originally, I wanted to control for union membership, because members of 
unions often have more positive towards the welfare state than non-members, because 
of for instance employment in a sector with interests in a extensive welfare state, 
mobilization by the unions to support policy that strengthens the welfare state, or that 
individuals that are positive towards the welfare state often join unions (Finseraas and 
Ringdal 2012: 76).  
I also wanted to include a variable that measured the respondents’ levels of job 
security, since this is the aspect of economic insecurity individuals are most likely to 
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fear in the context of economic globalization, according to Walter (2010: 414).  
However, the variable measuring union membership was omitted from wave 3, while 
the variable measuring job safety was omitted from wave 2. Both variables therefore 
have high missing values, and are excluded from the main analysis. To see if adding 
these variables to the analysis at the individual level will change the results 
substantially I have done so in an alternative analysis (see Table A5 in appendix). The 
results demonstrated some differences, but because the sample is severely reduced the 
results are not regarded as comparable to the main analysis. 
As already mentioned, Walter (2010) used the Offshore Ability Index 
developed by Blinder (2007) and Mulh (2007) for measuring a job’s potential to be 
moved abroad. She compared this index to the respondents sector of employment 
information from the WVS and assigned each respondent a value of offshore ability. 
This would function as a good measure of globalization exposure on the occupational 
level in this thesis as well, but due to time limitation this has not been accomplished. 
This would be an interesting measure to test for further research. 
 
3.5.3 Independent Variables at the Country-Year Level  
The main independent variable in this analysis is ECONOMIC GLOBALIZATION. I also 
control for two other measures at the country-year level: GDP per capita and a 
standardized version of the GINI Index. These variables are included to see the 
differences between developed and developing countries. For descriptive statistics, 
see Table 3.3. All country-year level variables are lagged one year to control for time 
dependence, thereby reducing the chances of reversed causality. 
 
Table 3.3 - Descriptive Statistics for Independent Variables at the Country-year Level 
  N Mean Std. dev. Minimum Maximum 
Economic Globalization 184 779 57.484 17.523 6.597 97.228 
GDP per capita 184 779 8.976 1.035 6.635 10.884 
GINI 184 779 37.284 9.624 21.700 64.618 
 
Economic Globalization 
The KOF index of globalization provides several variables that measure the different 
aspects of globalization. Three main dimensions are included in the overall index: 
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economic-, political-, and social globalization. The main independent variable in this 
analysis is ECONOMIC GLOBALIZATION, and is measured by the economic dimension 
of the KOF index. ECONOMIC GLOBALIZATION is a continuous variable, ranged from 
1–100. The sub-indexes for this variable are presented below. For information about 
weighting, see Table 3.4. 
The economic dimension of the KOF Index consists of two sub-indexes that is 
meant to proxy economic globalisation: (1) actual flows, including trade, flows of 
foreign direct investments (FDI), FDI in stocks, portfolio investments and income 
payments to foreign nationals – all measured as a percentage of GDP, and (2) 
restrictions, including hidden import barriers, mean tariff rate, taxes on international 
trade (percentages of current revenue), and capital account restrictions. Actual 
economic flows are, according to Dreher et al. (2008: 43), the usual measures of 
economic globalisation. However, restrictions on trade and capital are also added to 
proxy globalisation. This makes the economic dimension of the KOF index a robust 
measure for economic globalisation. 
 
Table 3.4  - Weighting of Economic Globalization in KOF Index (Dreher et al. 2008) 
Indices and variables  Weights (%) 
Economic globalization   
(i) Actual flows  (50) 
 Trade (percentage of GDP) (16) 
 Foreign direct investment, flows (percentage of GDP) (21) 
 Foreign direct investment, stocks (percentage of GDP) (23) 
 Portfolio investment (percentage of GDP) (19) 
 Income payments to foreign nationals (percentage of GDP) (22) 
(ii) Restrictions  (50) 
 Hidden import barriers (24) 
 Mean tariff rate (28) 
 Taxes on international trade (percentage of current 
revenue) 
(28) 
 Capital account restrictions (20) 
 
 
Trade is defined by Dreher et al. (2008: 43), as the sum of a country’s exports and 
imports, while portfolio investment is defined as the sum of a country’s assets and 
liabilities. Income payments to foreign nationals and capital are also included in this 
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measure to proxy the extent of a country’s employment of foreign people and capital 
in its production processes. A country with higher revenues from tariffs is less 
globalised, given a certain level of trade (Dreher et al. 2008: 43).  
To proxy restrictions on the capital account, an index constructed by 
Gwartney and Lawson (2002), based on the IMF’s Annual Report on Exchange 
Arrangements and Exchange Restrictions, is used (Dreher et al. 2008: 44). The 
original source for hidden import barriers is various issues of the World Economic 
Forum’s Global Competitiveness Report (Dreher et al. 2008: 44).  
 
GDP PC 
GDP PC is estimated from the World Development Indicators from the World Bank 
(2012), and is the gross domestic product in a country, divided by midyear population 
(World Bank 2013a). GDP is the sum of gross value added by all resident producers 
in the economy plus any product taxes and minus any subsidies not included in the 
value of the product. The data is constant in 2000 USD. This variable is log 
transformed using the natural logarithm (ln), because it is likely that the effect is 
logarithmic rather than linear. This is due to the law of diminishing marginal returns, 
which, used in the context of this thesis, says that for instance the effect of an increase 
in GDP per capita will matter more in countries with low GDP per capita than in 
countries with already high GDP per capita.  
 
GINI 
The Gini Index is a measure of inequality within an economy. More specifically it 
measures how much the distribution of income or consumption expenditure among 
individuals/households within an economy deviates from a perfectly equal 
distribution (World Bank 2013b). The variable GINI is a standardized measure of the 
Gini Index for income inequality, made available through SWIID (Solt 2009). 
Because the unstandardized Gini Index lacks values for many cases in different years, 
it reduces comparability across observations. The standardized measure is therefore 
preferable. The measure ranges from 0–100, where a value of 0 represents perfect 
economic equality, while a value of 100 implies perfect economic inequality.  
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4 Analysis and Discussion 
 
In this chapter I present the results from the main empirical analysis. In this analysis I 
have 184 779 units at level-1, 151 units at level-2 and 78 units at level-3. I will first 
explain how I have developed the models, before I interpret the results to see how 
economic globalization affects welfare attitudes. Furthermore, I will discuss my 
findings with basis in the theory and previous research presented in chapter 2. Lastly, 
I compare my main analysis with four alternative analyses, to see if the results I have 
found are robust.  
4.1 Economic Globalisation and Government Responsibility 
 
Figure 4.1 - Mean Values of ECONOMIC GLOBALIZATION and GOVERNMENT 
RESPONSIBILITY6
 
Note: red colour shows developing countries, while blue shows developed countries. The grouping is 
based on HDI from Human Development Reports7 
                                                
6 Two-letter country codes: AR = Argentina, AU = Australia, MA = Morocco, BA = Bosnia and Herzegovina, BE = Belgium, 
BF = Burkina Faso, BG = Bulgaria, BR = Brazil, CA = Canada, CL = Chile, CO = Colombia, CZ = Czech Republic, FI = 
Finland, GB = Great Britain, GH = Ghana, GR = Greece, GT = Guatemala, HR = Croatia, HU = Hungary, ID = Indonesia, IE = 
Ireland, IT = Italy, JP = Japan, KG = Kyrgyzstan, LI = Lithuania, LV = Latvia,  ML = Moldova, MT = Malta, MX = Mexico, NG 
= Nigeria, NZ = New Zealand, PE = Peru, PH = Philipines, PL = Poland, PT = Portugal, RS = Russian Federation, SV = El 
Salvador, SI = Slovenia, SK = Slovakia, TT = Trinidad and Tobago, UA = Ukraina, UY = Uruguay, VN = Vietnam, VE = 
Venezuela, ZM = Zambia, ZW = Zimbabwe 
7 http://hdr.undp.org/en/statistics/hdi/ 
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Figure 4.1 shows the mean of ECONOMIC GLOBALIZATION and GOVERNMENT 
RESPONSIBILITY for the countries included in my sample. The colour red shows 
developing countries, while the colour blue shows developed countries.  
As we can see from Figure 4.1, the developed nations dominate the high end 
of the economic globalization scale, while the developing nations dominate the low 
end. Figure 4.1 also show that the more globalized countries have generally lower 
mean scores on the GOVERNMENT RESPONSIBILITY scale, indicating more rightist 
attitudes. This is indicates the same relationship as hypothesis H1, that economic 
globalisation lead to more rightist attitudes in the public. However, it is necessary to 
investigate this matter further before drawing any conclusions. 
 
4.2 Development of the models  
In this analysis I follow the bottom-up strategy of starting with a simple model and 
adding complexities (Hox 2010). According to Hox (2010: 55–56) this is a more 
useful method in multilevel modelling compared to the top-down approach, since this 
may lead to convergence problems due to starting with a large, complicated model. 
Since the sample size is largest at the lowest level (the individual level), I will build 
the model from there. By doing this I avoid Hauser’s contextual fallacy (Hauser 
1970), and find how much of the level-2 and level-3 variations is explained by 
compositional effects.   
From the individual model I proceed by adding the main independent variable 
ECONOMIC GLOBALIZATION at level-2. This is done to see the effect this variable alone 
has on the dependent variable. In the third model I add the quadratic term of 
globalization: ECONOMIC GLOBALIZATION2 at level-2 to test for any curvilinear effects. 
In the fourth model I control for two other level-2 variables: GDP PC and GINI. In 
model 5 I add an interaction term consisting of ECONOMIC GLOBALIZATION and GDP. 
In model 6 I add yet another interaction term, consisting of ECONOMIC 
GLOBALIZATION2 and GDP PC to test for non-linear interaction effects between GDP PC 
and ECONOMIC GLOBALIZATION on GOVERNMENT RESPONSIBILITY, since economic 
globalization already has proven to have a curvilinear effect on its own. This does not 
seem to be the case for the relationship between ECONOMIC GLOBALIZATION and GDP 
PC on the dependent variable, with no statistically significant improvement from 
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model 4 (see Table A3 in appendix). I also tested for a quadratic term of GDP PC, and 
an interaction between GDP PC2 and ECONOMIC GLOBALIZATION – a relationship 
indicated by Figure 4.3 (see Table A4 in appendix). There were no significant 
improvements from Model 4, so Model 5 is therefore viewed as the best model. 
Model 8 is built from model 4, and contains two cross-level interaction terms, 
consisting of HIGH EDUCATION and ECONOMIC GLOBALIZATION, and HIGH EDUCATION 
and ECONOMIC GLOBALIZATION2. The quadratic interaction term is added by the same 
logic as with the interaction between GDP PC and ECONOMIC GLOBALIZATION2.  
In this analysis I will focus my discussion mainly on the two interaction 
models – model 5 and model 8 – and compare them to the previous models. Model 5 
and 8 is argued to be the best models mainly because of the important and significant 
interaction effects included here. The addition to this, none of the interactions affect 
the statistical significance of other variables, and they are therefore both an 
improvement from model 4. This is confirmed by the -2LL change.  
 
4.3 Results  
In this part of the chapter I will first present and interpret the results from the 
multilevel analysis with basis in model 5.  From this model I attempt to see how 
economic globalization affects welfare attitudes in general. Model 5 includes the 
interaction between ECONOMIC GLOBALIZATION and GDP PC, which is added to see if 
there are differences between the effects of economic globalization in developing and 
developed countries. Lastly, I will present and interpret the results with basis in model 
8, which includes the interaction between ECONOMIC GLOBALIZATION and HIGH 
EDUCATION, added to see if there are differences in how economic globalization 
affects globalization winners and losers.   
4.3.1 Model with Interaction of GDP PC and Economic Globalization 
Model 0–5 is presented in Table 1 below, and model 5 can be formally defined as:  
 
Υi = β0 + β1Xijk1+ β2Xijk2 + β3Xijk3 + β4Xijk4 + β5Xijk5 + β6Xijk6 + β7Xijk7 + γ8Zjk8 + γ9Zjk9 + 
γ10Zjk10 + γ11Zjk11 + γ12 Zjk10Zjk8+ γ13Zjk10Zjk9 + eijk + u0jk + v0k 
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Table 4.1 - Random Intercept Model with GOVERNMENT RESPONSIBILITY as Dependent Variable. 
Regression Coefficients with Standard Errors in Parentheses.  
 
 Model 0 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
Constant 5.967*** 6.479*** 7.586*** 6.200*** 7.352*** 2.194 
 (.101) (.102) (.282) (.580) (1.125) (2.043) 
Individual level       
Woman  .143*** .143*** .143*** .143*** .143*** 
  (.014) (.014) (.014) (.014) (.014) 
Age  .002*** .002*** .002*** .002*** .002*** 
  (.001) (.001) (.001) (.001) (.001) 
High Education   -.198***  -.198***  -.198***  -.198***  -.198*** 
  (.017) (.017) (.017) (.017) (.017) 
Income   -.113***  -.113***  -.112***  -.112***  -.113*** 
  (.003) (.003) (.003) (.003) (.003) 
Social Trust   -.041***  -.041**  -.040**  -.040**  -.040** 
  (.016) (.016) (.016) (.016) (.016) 
Married   -.027*  -.027*  -.027*  -.027*  -.027* 
  (.015) (.015) (.015) (.015) (.015) 
Employed   -.106***  -.106***  -.106***  -.106***  -.106*** 
  (.015) (.015) (.015) (.015) (.015) 
Country-year level       
Economic Globalization    -.019*** .036* .038* .127*** 
   (.001) (.020) (.021) (.036) 
Economic Globalization2     -.001***  -.001*** -.000 
    (.000) (.000) (.000) 
GDP      -.123 .589** 
     (.109) (.261) 
GINI      -.007  -.011 
     (.010) (.010) 
GDP*Economic 
Globalization       -.015*** 
      (.005) 
GDP*Economic 
Globalization2       
       
Random Effects       
se2 8.108 8.002 8.002 8.002 8.002 8.002 
su20 0.511 0.497 0.506 0.490 0.492 0.488 
sv20 0.492 0.457 0.309 0.282 0.269 0.218 
 -2LL -455 911 -454 697 -454 689 -454 686 -454 685 -454 681 
 -2LL change  2427.61*** 15.14*** 7.22** 1.39 8.42*** 
 
Note: *** = p<0.01, ** = p<0.05, * = p<0.1. se2 = variance of level-1 residual, su20 = variance of level-2 
residual, sv20 = variance of level-3 residual. 
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In the equation, Yi is the value of the dependent variable for individual I, and β0 is the 
intercept. βijkXijk represents the regression coefficients at the individual level i, within 
country-year j, in country k, while γjkZjk represents the regression coefficients at the 
country-year level, within country-year j, in country k. eijk, u0jk and v0k each represent 
the residual for the individual level, country-year level and country level.  
In model 5 the variables at the individual level are all statistically significant at 
the 0.01-level, except for MARRIED and SOCIAL TRUST, which are statistically 
significant at the 0.05-level and 0.1-level respectively. None of the variables at the 
individual level have altered substantially after adding variables at the country-year 
level.  
The results in model 5 shows that women have more leftist attitudes, and are 
thus more supportive towards increased government responsibility than men. This is 
in accordance with previous research, which finds that women are more prone to 
leftist attitudes than men (Finseraas and Ringdal 2012). The variable AGE indicates 
that people develop more leftist attitudes the older they get.  
The variables INCOME and HIGH EDUCATION show that the higher income and 
education an individual has, the more rightist attitudes he or she has towards 
government responsibility. This is as expected, as individuals with high income and 
education levels are able to take care of themselves, and do not have the need the 
amount of social services that people with lower income levels might have.  
The results from model 5 indicate that people with high levels of social trust 
are more negative towards government responsibility. In other words, high levels of 
social trust seem to correlate with rightist attitudes. This is surprising, as I had thought 
that the relationship between these variable would be the other way around. However, 
high levels of social trust might be an indicator for believing in the individual, thus 
having faith in that people are able to take care of themselves.  
The variable MARRIED indicates that individuals living with a husband, wife or 
partner have more rightist attitudes than those who do not. This is in accordance with 
the previous research, seeing as people that are a part of a two-income household are 
less vulnerable to economic insecurity than people that have to manage on one 
income only. The results from the variable EMPLOYED in model 5 indicate that 
individuals that have a job are more prone to rightist attitudes than those individuals 
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that are unemployed. This result is also as expected, as people without a job/income 
are more exposed to economic insecurity than people that are employed.  
At the country-year level I control for GDP PC and GINI in addition to the main 
independent variable ECONOMIC GLOBALIZATION. GDP PC and GINI are added to see if 
there are any differences between developing and developed countries, given the 
assumption that developed countries have higher levels of GDP per capita and lower 
levels of economic inequality. Since my main interest is in the variables that measure 
economic globalization, I add the level-2 controls in one step to examine how they 
affect the main independent variable GOVERNMENT RESPONSIBILITY.  
The results from model 4 shows that both GDP PC and GINI have a negative 
effect on the dependent variable. The negative coefficient of GINI implies that citizens 
living in countries with higher levels of inequality are less supportive towards 
government responsibility. This is surprising, since it is natural to believe that higher 
levels of inequality would cause citizens to support more redistribution. However, this 
variable is not statistically significant and cannot be used to generalize to the 
population. The negative coefficient of GDP PC indicates that citizens in countries with 
higher GDP per capita are less supportive towards government responsibility than 
citizens in countries with lower GDP per capita. This again, indicates that individuals 
living in typical developed countries, where GDP per capita is high, have more 
rightist attitudes than those living in typical developing countries, with lower levels of 
GDP per capita. This indicates that hypothesis H4: Individuals in developing 
countries will have more leftist welfare attitudes than individuals living in developed 
countries, could be confirmed. But unfortunately, this variable is not statistically 
significant in model 4, and the effect cannot be generalized to the population. GDP PC 
is however statistically significant in the final model, which will be discussed below 
in relation to the interaction term between GDP PC and ECONOMIC GLOBALIZATION. 
As mentioned previously, the main independent variable in this analysis is 
ECONOMIC GLOBALIZATION. Adding this to the analysis does not alter the results of the 
variables on the individual level to a large degree. When first added in model 2, the 
coefficient for ECONOMIC GLOBALIZATION is statistically significant at the 0.01-level, 
and indicates that economic globalization leads to less support for government 
responsibility – in other words, more rightist attitudes towards welfare.  
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To test for hypothesis H2, a quadratic term of ECONOMIC GLOBALIZATION is added – 
ECONOMIC GLOBALIZATION2. When adding this quadratic term, the original economic 
globalization variable alters. It becomes negative and shows a slightly larger effect. It 
is still statistically significant, but only at the 0.1-level. However, ECONOMIC 
GLOBALIZATION2 is statistically significant at the 0.01-level, and shows a negative 
effect. This indicates that there is a curvilinear effect here. To investigate this effect, I 
used the graph presented in Figure 4.1 below. 
 
Figure 4.2 - Curvilinearity of ECONOMIC GLOBALIZATION 
 
Note: Predicted probabilities for curvilinearity of ECONOMIC GLOBALIZATION from the data material. 
All other variables are set at their mean.  
 
As we can see from Figure 4.1, the effect of economic globalization on government 
responsibility is only slightly curvilinear. The effect of economic globalization 
increases up to a point (24.62) and then decreases. In other words, economic 
globalization has a positive effect on government responsibility up until a country 
reaches 24.62 on the economic globalization scale. After this point the effect is 
negative, and indicates that citizens are more positive towards privatization, 
individualism and a less extensive welfare state.  
 52 
The results from the final model confirm the hypotheses H1: Increased economic 
globalization leads to rightist welfare attitudes among citizens and H2: After a 
country reaches a certain level of competitiveness, the effect of economic 
globalization on welfare attitudes will shift from leftist to rightist. As we can see from 
Figure 4.1, the more economic globalized a country is, the more rightist view the 
public opinion has on economic welfare, after the country reaches 24.62 on the KOF 
scale of ECONOMIC GLOBALIZATION.  
The argument of the rational choice model and neoliberal proponents of 
globalization, presented above, supports this finding. Neoliberalism states that 
globalization will lead to prosperity and economic growth for countries that opens up 
to it (Scholte 2005). Assuming this point of view, and the view of rational choice 
theory, which argues that people will act in their own best interest, individuals that 
experience higher levels of economic globalization will develop attitudes that are 
more supportive of individual responsibility and less welfare oriented. Consequently, 
this result invalidates the hypothesis H3: Increased economic globalization leads to 
leftist welfare attitudes among citizens. Increased globalization does a leftist view on 
economic welfare among citizens up to a certain point (24.62), but after this point, the 
citizens become more rightist in their views on this topic.  
In model 5 an interaction term between GDP PC and ECONOMIC GLOBALIZATION 
is added to see if economic globalization affects developing and developed countries 
differently, as hypothesised in H5: Economic globalization leads to leftist welfare 
attitudes for citizens in developing nations, and rightist welfare attitudes for citizens 
in developed nations. Adding the interaction does not alter the results of the 
independent variables at the individual level, but of course affects the variables at the 
country-year level that are a part of the interaction.  
In model 5 GDP PC is statistically significant and shows that increasing levels 
of GDP per capita in a country leads to more leftist welfare attitudes among citizens. 
This is a change from model 4 where GDP PC demonstrates that higher levels of GDP 
per capita lead to more rightist welfare attitudes. However, in model 5 GDP PC is a part 
of an interaction with ECONOMIC GLOBALIZATION, and therefore it is important to 
interpret the interaction before drawing any conclusions. Since the interaction is 
constructed with two continuous variables, it is easier to interpret it graphically, as in 
Figure 4.3.  
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Figure 4.3 - Interaction Effects of GDP PER CAPITA and ECONOMIC GLOBALIZATION on 
GOVERNMENT RESPONSIBILITY 
 
Note: Predicted probabilities for minimum, mean and maximum values of ECONOMIC GLOBALIZATION 
and GDP PER CAPITA from the data material. All other variables are set at their mean.  
 
As we can see from Figure 4.3, the most striking differences in attitudes towards 
economic welfare manifests themselves when economic globalization is at its highest. 
With high levels of economic globalization, citizens that live in countries with low 
levels of GDP per capita have leftist attitudes towards government responsibility. In 
other words, they support an extensive welfare state and think that the state should 
take responsibility for its citizens. For citizens who live in countries with higher levels 
of GDP per capita the effect of economic globalization creates more rightist attitudes 
towards welfare. This indicates that these citizens lean towards more individualism 
and less government responsibility.  
For countries that experience lower levels of economic globalization the 
difference between levels of GDP per capita is not as substantial. Still, Figure 4.3 
shows that citizens in countries with low levels of economic globalization and low 
levels of GDP per capita have more leftist attitudes towards government responsibility 
than citizens in countries with high levels of GDP per capita. When GDP PC is set at its 
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mean value, we can see that the attitudes of the citizens do not change substantially 
with increasing degrees of economic globalization.  
In other words, the results demonstrate that there seem to be a difference in the 
effect of economic globalization on welfare attitudes in developing and developed 
countries. Citizens in developed countries develop more rightist attitudes as the 
degree of economic globalization increases, while citizens in developing countries on 
the other hand, develop more leftist attitudes as the degree of economic globalization 
increases. This indicates that hypothesis H5 can be confirmed.  
Since economic globalization has a curvilinear effect on its own, I have also 
tested an interaction between GDP PC and ECONOMIC GLOBALIZATION2 (see Table A3 
in appendix). The results indicated a curvilinear relationship, but the effect was very 
small and not statistically significant. The likelihood ratio test shows that adding this 
interaction term has not improved the model from model 5, and therefore I conclude 
that model 5 is more preferable than model 6.  
Furthermore, it could also seem that GDP PC has a curvilinear effect on 
GOVERNMENT RESPONSIBILITY. However, when controlling for an interaction between 
ECONOMIC GLOBALIZATION and GDP PC2  (see Table A4 in appendix), the results 
demonstrates that there is not a curvilinear effect here. The likelihood ratio test shows 
that adding the interaction term to the analysis has not improved the model from 
model 5, and therefore I conclude that model 5 is preferable from model 7. 
 
4.3.2 Model with Interaction of Education and Economic Globalization 
To test for hypothesis H6: Globalization losers have more leftist attitudes than 
globalization winners and H7: the difference between globalization winners and 
losers will be largest in countries with a high degree of economic globalization; two 
cross-level interaction terms are included in Model 8. By examining interactions 
between education and economic globalization I am able to investigate if economic 
globalization affects the welfare attitudes of individuals with different degrees of 
education in different ways. Model 8 is presented in Table 4.2 below. 
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Table 4.2. Random Intercept Model with GOVERNMENT RESPONSIBILITY as Dependent Variable. 
Regression Coefficients with Standard Errors in Parentheses.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: *** = p<0.01, ** = p<0.05, * = p<0.1. se2 = variance of level-1 residual, su20 = variance of level-2 
residual, sv20 = variance of level-3 residual. 
 
 
 Model 4 Model 8 
Constant 7.352*** 7.364*** 
 (1.125) (1.128) 
Individual level   
Woman .143*** .141*** 
 (.014) (.014) 
Age .002*** .002*** 
 (.001) (.001) 
High Education  -.198***  -.386*** 
 (.017) (.123) 
Income  -.112***  -.113*** 
 (.003) (.003) 
Social Trust  -.040**  -.048*** 
 (.016) (.016) 
Married  -.027*  -.030** 
 (.015) (.015) 
Employed  -.106***  -.105*** 
 (.015) (.015) 
Country-year level   
Economic Globalization .038* .038* 
 (.021) (.021) 
Economic Globalization2  -.001***  -.001*** 
 (.000) (.000) 
GDP PC  -.123  -.120 
 (.109) (.110) 
GINI  -.007  -.007 
 (.010) (.010) 
High Education*Economic 
Globalization   -.002 
  (.004) 
High Education*Economic 
Globalization2  .000** 
  (.000) 
Random Effects   
se2 8.002 8.000 
su20 0.492 0.489 
sv20 0.269 0.273 
 -2LL -454 685 -454 653 
 -2LL change 1.39 63.48*** 
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The variables at the individual level do not alter much in effect and statistical 
significance when the two interactions are added. The exception from this is of course 
the variable that is a part of the interactions, namely HIGH EDUCATION. However, this 
variable now shows that when the value of ECONOMIC GLOBALIZATION is 0, 
individuals with high education are more negative towards government responsibility 
than those with lower education. With HIGH EDUCATION being a proxy for skill level, 
which is entered to separate globalization winners from globalization losers, this 
indicates that globalization losers have more leftist attitudes than globalization 
winners.  This evidence leads me to confirm hypothesis H6: Globalization losers have 
more leftist welfare attitudes than globalization winners. 
As mentioned above, the interactions between economic globalization and 
education are added to test for hypothesis H7: the difference between globalization 
winners and losers will be largest in countries with a high degree of economic 
globalization. The first interaction between ECONOMIC GLOBALIZATION and HIGH 
EDUCATION assumes a linear effect, while the second interaction is made up of HIGH 
EDUCATION and ECONOMIC GLOBALIZATION2, and tests for curvilinear effects. The two 
interactions are added in one step, and their coefficients indicate that there is some 
degree of curvilinearity present here. The interaction effect of education and 
economic globalization is presented in Figure 4.4.  
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Figure 4.4 - Interaction Effects of HIGH EDUCATION and ECONOMIC GLOBALIZATION2 on 
GOVERNMENT RESPONSIBILITY 
 
Note: calculated from model 5, using predicted probabilities. All variables are set to their mean. 
 
Figure 4.4 demonstrates the effects of the interaction between ECONOMIC 
GLOBALIZATION2 and HIGH EDUCATION on the dependent variable, GOVERNMENT 
RESPONSIBILITY. The effect is curvilinear, indicating that there is a rightist shift in 
attitudes, for both high- and low-skilled individuals, after a country reaches a certain 
degree of economic globalization. Figure 4.4 also shows that the effect of education 
matters slightly more in determining individuals’ attitudes towards economic welfare 
in highly economically globalized countries. In less economically globalized 
countries the difference between those with high education and those with less 
education is smaller, but still present. From model 8 we can conclude that 
globalization losers have more leftist attitudes towards economic welfare than 
globalization winners, and this effect is slightly greater in highly globalized countries, 
thus confirming H7.  
To summarize the findings, the statistical evidence suggests that at first glance 
an increase in level of economic globalization seems to create a rightist shift in 
welfare attitudes. However, this seems to be mostly true for citizens of developed 
countries. The results show that individuals that live in developing countries 
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experience a leftist shift in attitudes with increasing degree of economic globalization, 
in accordance with the compensation hypothesis. The evidence also suggests that 
high-skilled individuals have more rightist attitudes towards economic welfare, than 
low-skilled individuals. In other words, globalization winners, in both individual and 
country sense, tend to be less supportive of an extensive welfare state and government 
responsibility than globalization losers.  
 
4.4 Discussion  
In this analysis I have tested how economic globalization affects the publics’ attitudes 
towards welfare. By testing different individual measures of risk at individual level, 
and GDP PC and GINI together with economic globalization at the country-year level, I 
have attempted to answer six hypotheses regarding the effects of these on the 
dependent variable GOVERNMENT RESPONSIBILITY.  
 
4.4.1 Rightist or Leftist Shift? 
The first hypothesis of this paper is H1: Increased economic globalization leads to 
rightist welfare attitudes among citizens. This hypothesis has its basis in the argument 
from rational choice theory that individuals will make rational choices, based on the 
information they have. In other words, they will act in their own self-interest (Downs 
1957). Neoliberals argue that countries that open up their economy to global market 
forces will experience economic growth and prosperity. These assumptions combined 
lead me to believe that citizens in countries that experience high levels of economic 
globalization will develop more rightist attitudes, because of rising standards of 
living. When people make more money and the economy goes well, they are able to 
take care of themselves, and no longer have the need for extended social services. 
Economic prosperity can in other words make people feel that they are contributors 
to, rather than users of, the welfare state. If people start to feel that they do not gain as 
much from the welfare state as they get in return, they are prone to develop attitudes 
that correspond with individualism and less government responsibility.  
This hypothesis is tested by adding the measure of ECONOMIC GLOBALIZATION 
in model 4. From model 4 we can see that this variable has a statistically significant 
negative effect, indicating that H1 is validated.  However, when testing for hypothesis 
H2: After a country reaches a certain level of competitiveness, the effect of economic 
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globalization on welfare attitudes will shift from leftist to rightist, the quadratic term 
of ECONOMIC GLOBALIZATION is added in model 5, namely ECONOMIC 
GLOBALIZATION2. This is statistically significant and leads to changes in the effect of 
ECONOMIC GLOBALIZATION: this becomes positive, while the quadratic term becomes 
negative, indicating a curvilinear relationship here. This indicates that H1 cannot be 
validated.  
Hypothesis H2 bases itself on the theories of comparative advantages and 
rational choice theory, and assumes a shift in welfare attitudes from leftist to rightist. 
Before a country becomes competitive on the global market, it will not profit much 
from the internationalization and liberalization that comes with economic 
globalization. As the citizens realize this, they may want to protect themselves against 
external shocks and offshoring of firms by supporting increased government 
responsibility, state intervention and a well-developed welfare state. Thus, this leads 
to leftist welfare attitudes. After a country have reached a certain level of 
competitiveness it will start to gain more from economic globalization, and as the 
citizens realize that their country is successful in the global market, they will develop 
more rightist attitudes that correspond with more individual responsibility, less state 
intervention and privatization of business. 
The result from the ECONOMIC GLOBALIZATION-measures of model 5 shows 
that H2 can be validated, as there is indeed a curvilinear relationship here. However, 
when examining this relationship in Figure 4.2, we are able to see that this is 
curvilinear relationship is not that strong. But the effect is still there, and it is 
statistically significant, and therefore I argue that H2 can be validated.  
Finding a rightist shift in welfare attitudes consequently invalidates hypothesis 
H3: Increased economic globalization leads to leftist welfare attitudes among citizens. 
This hypothesis had its basis in the compensation hypothesis, which, in short, states 
that globalization will lead to more support for welfare mechanisms because of the 
economic insecurity and volatility it brings. Walter (2010) found the compensation 
hypothesis to be valid in her analysis of Switzerland. On the other hand, previous 
research on the compensation hypothesis shows that this argument is controversial 
(e.g. Rehm 2009; Down 2007; Kim 2007; Iversen and Cusack 2000).  
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4.4.2 Differences between winners and losers 
H4: Individuals in developing countries will have more leftist welfare attitudes than 
individuals living in developed countries; was tested by adding GDP PC at country-year 
level in the analysis. The argument behind this hypothesis was that citizens of 
developing countries have less education and job security than citizens of developed 
countries. Because of this, citizens in developing countries might demand more 
welfare benefits from the government to protect them from the external risks of 
globalization. When added in model 4 GDP PC had a negative effect, indicating that the 
argument behind H4 could be validated. However, this measure proved not to be 
statistically significant, and hypothesis H4 can therefore not be validated.  
By adding the interaction term between GDP PC and ECONOMIC 
GLOBALIZATION I was able to test whether the effect of economic globalization is 
different in countries with different degrees of GDP per capita. I used this measure as 
an indication of the difference in effect of globalization in developing and developed 
countries, given the assumption that developed countries have higher GDP per capita 
than developing countries.  
The descriptive statistics presented in Figures 2.3–2.6 in chapter 2, indicated 
that there is indeed a difference in effect of economic globalization between 
developed and developing countries. The mean values of the dependent variable 
government responsibility were lower for developing countries, than for developed 
countries, indicating more leftist attitudes in developing countries, and more rightist 
attitudes in developed countries. The mean values of economic globalization indicated 
that developed countries are more integrated in the global market than developing 
countries.  
The results from Model 5 confirm that the degree of economic globalization 
have different effects on developing and developed countries, which indicates that the 
effects of economic globalization on welfare attitudes might be more complex than a 
clean leftist or rightist shift in attitudes.  The citizens of developed countries develop 
more rightist attitudes as the degree of economic globalization increases. For citizens 
of developing countries, the effect is reversed. Here, the public develops more leftist 
attitudes with higher levels of economic globalization.  This result suggest that 
hypothesis H5: Economic globalization leads to leftist welfare attitudes for citizens in 
developing nations, and rightist welfare attitudes for citizens in developed nations, 
can be confirmed. 
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This indicates that the two first hypothesis of this thesis that argue for a rightist shift 
in attitudes with higher degrees of economic globalization is valid for developed 
countries, while the hypothesis H3 with basis in the compensation hypothesis might 
be valid for developing countries. By this logic, the results might have been different 
if there were more developing countries included in the sample used in this analysis.  
The two last hypotheses, H6: Globalization losers have more leftist attitudes 
than globalization winners, and H7: The difference between globalization winners 
and losers will be largest in countries with a high degree of economic globalization, 
is tested in model 8. To be able to identify globalization winners and losers, I used the 
measure of education as a proxy for skill-level. Walter (2010) argues that 
globalization losers will feel more insecure than globalization winners, and that they 
therefore demand more social protection.  
With higher levels of economic globalization come higher levels of risks. I 
therefore hypothesise that the difference between winners and losers will be highest 
here. Globalization winners are high skilled, and are more prone to gain from 
globalization because they are in a position where they can sell their skills to the 
global market. Globalization losers, on the other hand, are more exposed to insecurity 
with higher levels of economic globalization, because the goods they produce can 
easily be replaced with imported goods from low-wage countries.  
The results from model 8 show that both hypothesis H6 and H7 can be 
confirmed. The interaction term indicated that individuals with low skill-levels have 
more leftist attitudes than individuals with high skill-levels. However, as shown in 
Figure 4.4, the difference between these two groups is small. Despite this weak effect, 
H7 can be confirmed since the effect is statistically significant.  
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4.4.3 Summary 
Here I will briefly sum up the main findings presented in this thesis. The results from 
this multilevel analysis show that economic globalization has an effect on the public’s 
welfare attitudes. There seem to be a rightist shift in attitudes towards welfare because 
of increased economic globalization, but this might be the case for developed 
countries only. For developing countries, there seem to be a leftist shift in attitudes 
with increased economic globalization. In general, globalization losers are more 
supportive towards government responsibility than globalization winners, and the 
difference between these two groups are largest in countries with high degrees of 
economic globalization.   
 
Table 4.3 - Summary of the Hypotheses II 
 Supported Not 
Supported 
H1: Increased economic globalization leads to rightist welfare 
attitudes among citizens 
 
 X 
H2: After a country reaches a certain level of competitiveness, the 
effect of economic globalization on welfare attitudes will shift 
from leftist to rightist 
 
X  
H3: Increased economic globalization leads to leftist welfare 
attitudes among citizens 
 
 X 
H4: Individuals in developing countries will have more leftist 
welfare attitudes than individuals living in developed countries  
 
 X 
H5: Economic globalization leads to leftist welfare attitudes for 
citizens in developing nations, and rightist welfare attitudes for 
citizens in developed nations 
 
X  
H6: Globalization losers have more leftist welfare attitudes than 
globalization winners 
 
X  
H7: The difference between globalization winners and losers will 
be largest in countries with a high degree of economic 
globalization  
X  
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4.5 Alternative Models 
In this part of the chapter I will discuss the sensitivity models I have performed to test 
the robustness of the results presented in the previous sections. I present four 
alternative models to ensure that minor changes of the variables or observations in the 
analysis does not change the results substantially: adding DEMOCRACY at country-year 
level, controlling for UNION MEMBERSHIP and JOB SECURITY at the individual level and 
two alternative measures (PRIVATE VS STATE OWNERSHIP OF BUSINESS and INCOME 
EQUALITY) of welfare attitudes as dependent variable. These sensitivity models deal 
with some of the limitations of the main analyses, and are performed to ensure that 
these limitations have not altered the results.  
 
4.5.1 Controlling for Level of Democracy at Country-Year Level 
By adding the measures of GDP PC and GINI I attempt to separate developed countries 
from developing countries. GDP per capita was added to demonstrate the difference 
in welfare attitudes for countries with different levels of gross domestic product, 
while the standardized GINI Index was added to show the difference in welfare 
attitudes for countries with different levels of economic inequality. However, the 
difference between developed and developing countries constitute more than these to 
measures. In this alternative analysis I have added DEMOCRACY at the country-year 
level to investigate if the results change when controlling for level of democracy. The 
assumption behind this is that higher levels of democracy are a feature of developed 
nations, while developing nations have generally lower levels of democracy.  
The variable DEMOCRACY ranges from 0–20, where 0 represents least 
democratic, and 20 represents most democratic. The measure is constructed by 
Hadenius and Teorell (2005), who have combined two democracy indexes – one from 
Freedom House and one from Polity. The variable DEMOCRACY is based on the scale 
from the Quality of Government Dataset (Teorell, Samanni, Holmberg and Rothstein 
2011). The Freedom House index measures democracy along two dimensions: 
political rights and civil liberties. The two dimensions include different sub-
dimensions. The sub-dimensions for political rights include various electoral aspects: 
the right of opposition parties to take part, the fairness of the electoral process, the 
real power attached to elective organs, and so on. The sub-dimensions for civil 
liberties embraces freedom for media and organizations, including political parties, 
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the right of assembly, the absence of political prisoners and of political control over 
the judiciary, and so on. Hadenius and Teorell (2005) argue that the components of 
the Freedom House index cover the entire range of basic democracy criteria, but that 
there are components that are dubious and irrelevant and do not belong among the 
basic procedural criteria of democracy. They conclude that the index performs poorly 
in the methodological area, but much better concerning validity. 
The Polity index has two indicators: one for democracy and one for autocracy. 
Hadenius and Teorell (2005) present the index’ strength in the methodological area, 
because of its disaggregated components. On the other hand, they criticize the index 
for the weak connection between operative measurements and basic democratic 
criteria. Despite critical notes on both indexes, Hadenius and Teorell (2005) conclude 
that these two indexes together construct are the best measure of democracy. They 
show that the two indices deviate in different ways, and therefore even out each other 
when they are combined. The combined index has a better fit than both of its 
individual components in terms of mean difference and spread (Hadenius and Teorell 
2005). 
As we can see from Table A5 in the appendix, controlling for level of 
democracy at the country-year level does not change the results of the analysis 
substantially. The coefficient of democracy shows that citizens in countries with 
higher levels of democracy are more negative towards government responsibility than 
citizens in countries with lower levels of democracy. However, this variable is not 
statistically significant, and this finding cannot be generalized to the population. 
Because of these results I conclude that the original analysis presented in this thesis 
did not suffer from omitting level of democracy at the country-year level.  
 
4.5.2 Controlling for Union Membership and Job Security at Individual 
Level 
As mentioned previously in chapter 3, I originally wanted to include a measure of 
union membership and job security at the individual level of this analysis. The reason 
for including this measure is that union members often tend to be more positive 
towards the welfare state than non-members. The measure of job security was thought 
to proxy the aspect of economic insecurity individuals are most likely to fear in the 
context of economic globalization, in accordance with Walter (2010: 414). Those who 
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emphasize job security as important in a job, are assumed to fear the economic 
insecurity that economic globalization brings, and are more prone to be globalization 
losers. The reason these variables are not included in my main analysis is that they 
were omitted from wave 2 and 3 of the WVS, drastically reducing my N at all three 
levels. However, I have included them in the sensitivity analysis presented here.  
The measures of union membership and job security are two dummy 
variables. For UNION MEMBERSHIP the respondents with membership represent the 
value 1, while non-members are the reference category 0. For JOB SECURITY the 
respondents who emphasize the importance of job security have the value 1, while 
those respondents who did not mention job security as important are set as the 
reference category.  
Adding UNION MEMBERSHIP and JOB SECURITY to the analysis reduces the 
sample from 184 779 cases to 30 742 cases at the individual level. When these two 
variables are included there is only 27 units at level 3, compared to 78 in the main 
analysis. Adding the variables does change the results (see Table A6 in the appendix), 
but because of the reduction in sample size, the results are not comparable to the main 
analysis.  
4.5.3 Different Measures of Welfare Attitudes 
One of the limitations of this thesis, that also Finseraas and Ringdal (2012) find 
problematic, is the issue of reducing the concept of welfare attitudes to one specific 
measure. In this thesis this specific measure is GOVERNMENT RESPONSIBILITY. I argue, 
in the same way as Walter (2010), that it is preferable to use a more general measure 
of welfare attitudes. My assumption is that a variable that measures attitudes towards 
government responsibility is able to cover more of the different aspects of welfare 
attitudes to a larger degree than for instance a variable measuring attitudes towards 
private versus state ownership of business. However, Kumlin (2007) states that it is 
difficult for people to assess their attitudes towards these general measures. This can 
turn into an issue of validity – are we really are measuring what we want to measure? 
I have therefore done the analysis with two other measures as dependent variable that 
can be said to cover parts of the aspects of welfare attitudes: PRIVATE VS. STATE 
OWNERSHIP OF BUSINESS and INCOME EQUALITY.  
I originally used PCA and the Cronbach’s Alpha test to assess if PRIVATE VS. 
STATE OWNERSHIP OF BUSINESS, INCOME EQUALITY and GOVERNMENT RESPONSIBILITY 
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could be used as a scale. The PCA showed that they loaded on the same component 
(see Table A1 in appendix), but the Cronbach’s Alpha test indicated low internal 
reliability (.282). This is logical, as the three variables in question each measure a 
different concept of welfare attitudes. The results from the sensitivity analyses also 
confirm that this might be the case.  
The variable PRIVATE VS STATE OWNERSHIP OF BUSINESS ranges on a scale 
from 1–10, where the value 1 represents support for private ownership of business, 
while the value 10 represents support for state ownership. In other words, low values 
indicate favourability towards privatization, while high values indicate that the 
individual favours government ownership and/or control. The results from the 
analysis with PRIVATE VS STATE OWNERSHIP OF BUSINESS as the dependent variable are 
presented in Table A7 in the appendix. Here we can see that the results in general are 
the same, except for two variables. MARRIED now indicates that individuals that are a 
part of a two-income household have more leftist attitudes, supporting state 
ownership of business. Both GDP PC and GINI are now statistically significant, and the 
coefficient for GINI is now positive. This indicates that citizens of countries with high 
levels of inequality have more leftist attitudes.  
The variable INCOME EQUALITY ranges on a scale from 1–10, where the value 
1 represents support for larger income differences as incentives, while the value 10 
represents support towards more income redistribution. The results from the analysis 
with income equality as the dependent variable are presented in Table A8 in the 
appendix. From this we can see that the results at the individual level are similar to 
the results from the main analysis. However, at the country-year level there are not 
many statistically significant results. ECONOMIC GLOBALIZATION is only significant in 
model 2, while GDP PC is significant model 4 and 7. The interactions between HIGH 
EDUCATION and the ECONOMIC GLOBALIZATION-measures are also significant in model 
7.  
As mentioned previously, the results from the analyses with different 
dependent variables indicate that the variables GOVERNMENT RESPONSIBILITY, 
OWNERSHIP OF BUSINESS and INCOME EQUALITY does not capture the same aspects of 
welfare attitudes. I therefore stand by the argument for using GOVERNMENT 
RESPONSIBILITY as a more general measure of welfare attitudes.  
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5 Conclusion 
 
The overall research question of this thesis is how does economic globalization affect 
welfare attitudes? By using individual level data from the WVS and contextual data 
from the KOF Index of Globalization (Dreher et al. 2008), World Bank (2012) and 
SWIID (Solte 2009), I have been able to investigate the relationship between 
economic globalization and the public’s economic left right attitudes with the use of 
multilevel modelling. This has led me to conclude that economic globalization does 
indeed affect welfare attitudes. In this section I will sum up how a contextual factor 
like globalization affects peoples’ welfare attitudes. 
 
5.1 Findings  
Theory and previous research presented two opposing views on the effects of 
economic globalization. The compensation hypothesis argued for a leftist shift in 
attitudes, because the citizens demand protection against the external risks that come 
with increasing economic globalization (Walter 2010).  Neoliberal thoughts on the 
relationship between economic globalization and growth, as well as rational choice 
theory constituted the basis of the opposing view. This argument was that because 
economic globalization leads to prosperity and economic growth, the citizens of 
economically globalized countries will become richer, and thus not needing the safety 
net of the welfare state (to the same degree as in less economically globalized 
societies). The evidence suggests that increased economic globalization leads to more 
rightist attitudes in the public, but also that the situation is more complex than that. 
Economic globalization seems to create a shift in attitudes from leftist to rightist, after 
a country reaches a certain level of competitiveness. Also, the effects of economic 
globalization on welfare attitudes seem to be different in developing and developed 
countries.   
The theoretical basis of my first hypothesis: Increased economic globalization 
leads to rightist welfare attitudes among citizens, is the neoliberal argument that 
globalization leads to economic growth and prosperity (Scholte 2005). By the self-
interest based logic of rational choice theory, individuals with high income level 
and/or future prospects of high levels will have more rightist welfare attitudes, rather 
than support more government responsibility and state intervention. This hypothesis 
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was invalidated as there was discovered a curvilinear effect of economic globalization 
on government responsibility.  
The curvilinear effect of economic globalization confirmed my second 
hypothesis: After a country reaches a certain level of competitiveness, the effect of 
economic globalization on welfare attitudes will shift from leftist to rightist. This 
hypothesis assumed a shift from leftist to rightist attitudes, based on theories of 
comparative advantages and rational choice theory. Before a country becomes 
competitive on the world market, it does not gain from economic globalization. 
However, after a country reaches a certain level of competitiveness, it starts to gain 
from economic globalization and the citizens develop attitudes more rightist attitudes, 
as they realize that their country is successful in the global market competition.  
The third hypothesis: Increased economic globalization leads to leftist welfare 
attitudes among citizens, argued for more leftist attitudes because of economic 
globalization with basis in the compensation hypothesis. This hypothesis states that 
increased economic globalization will lead to demands for an expanded welfare state 
to protect citizens from the risk of external shocks and volatility that might follow 
(Walter 2010). This hypothesis was not confirmed, as the evidence suggested that 
increased economic globalization leads to more rightist attitudes towards welfare.  
The results from the analysis showed that the fourth hypothesis: Individuals in 
developing countries will have more leftist welfare attitudes than individuals living in 
developed countries, could not be confirmed. This was because the variable GDP PER 
CAPITA proved not to be statistically significant, and the results could therefore not be 
generalized to the population.  
Furthermore, the hypothesis: Economic globalization leads to leftist welfare 
attitudes for citizens in developing nations, and rightist welfare attitudes for citizens 
in developed nations, was confirmed. It seems that even though both developing and 
developed nations might gain from economic globalization; it is the developing 
countries that get the rough end of the stick (Buckman 2004). With this in mind, it is 
possible that the compensation hypothesis might hold more ground with regards to 
developing countries.  
The results proved that my sixth hypothesis: Globalization losers have more 
leftist welfare attitudes than globalization winners could be confirmed. In accordance 
with theory that emphasizes how globalization winners have lower risk levels than 
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globalization losers (Walter 2010), the results show that high-skilled individuals are 
more supportive towards individualism and less state intervention, while low-skilled 
individuals are more supportive towards government responsibility and an extensive 
welfare state.  
As mentioned previously, the effect of individual factors can be strengthened 
by contextual factors, and this seems to be the case with the relationship between 
economic globalization and globalization winners and losers. In countries with high 
levels of economic globalization, the risks for globalization losers and the gains for 
globalization winners would be greater. Hypothesis seven: The difference between 
globalization winners and losers will be largest in countries with a high degree of 
economic globalization is therefore confirmed, although the difference in effect at 
higher levels of economic globalization was only slightly present.  
Summing up, the evidence seems to point to some general conclusions: 
increased economic globalization has an effect on the public’s welfare attitudes. 
There seems to be a rightist shift in attitudes towards welfare due to increased 
economic globalization. However, the results indicate that this is true for developed 
nations only. Citizens in developing countries seem to develop more leftist attitudes 
as the level of economic globalization increases. This might be because the public in 
developing countries in general are poorer than those of developed countries, and thus 
have stronger needs for the security that the welfare state can provide.  In general, the 
evidence suggests that globalization losers are more supportive towards government 
responsibility and welfare benefits than globalization winners, and the difference 
between these two groups are slightly larger in highly economically globalized 
countries. 
 
5.2 Limitations and Further Research 
The findings presented in this thesis are based on data from several developing and 
developed countries. The sample consists of more developed than developing 
countries, and this have most likely affected the results. Therefore I am cautious about 
generalizing the findings of this thesis to the population. Another limitation I want to 
address is the classification of individuals as globalization winners or losers. I have 
used education as proxy for skill-level, thus emphasizing the factoral approach to this 
classification.  
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Walter (2010) argues that it is also important to draw on the sectoral approach to 
classify globalization winners and losers. The sectoral approach emphasizes how 
globalization can pose as a threat to individuals’ jobs and wages. As mentioned 
previously, I wanted to use the Offshore Ability Index of Blinder (2007) to identify 
sectors of employment that are particularly vulnerable to offshoring. However, due to 
time limitations I was not able to create a measure of offshore ability based on this 
index. Further research would be well advised to implement both sectoral and factoral 
approaches to identify globalization winners and losers, to see if the differences 
indicated by this analysis are robust.  
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Appendix 
 
Table A1 – Component Matrix for PCA of Scale of Welfare Attitudes 
 
Variables  
Income Equality .541 
Ownership of Business .586 
Government Responsibility .779 
Note: Since only one component was extracted the components could not be rotated. I therefore present the 
component matrix as an alternative measure.  
 
 
Figure A1 – Frequency Distribution of GOVERNMENT RESPONSIBILITY 
 
 
 
Table A2 – Tolerance Values 
 
Variables  
Woman .940 
Age .851 
High Education .899 
Income .858 
Social Trust .952 
Married .909 
Employed .856 
Economic Globalization .538 
GDP PC .452 
GINI .775 
Note: The tolerance value of each X-variable is the proportion of its variance that is not shared with other X-
variables. If tolerance values are lower than 0.2 or 0.1, the result of the analysis becomes less stable (Hamilton 
1992: 134). The inclusion of interaction terms in a model is often a cause of multicollienarity (Hamilton 1992: 
107). Since the interactions in the final models are a significant improvement of the former models, I accept the 
increased multicollienarity they cause, and therefore I have not reported their tolerance values.  
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Table A3 – Random Intercept Model with GOVERNMENT RESPONSIBILITY as Dependent 
Variable. Regression Coefficients with Standard Errors in Parentheses.   
 
 Model 6 
Constant 2.178 
 (3.448) 
Individual level 
Woman .143*** 
 (.014) 
Age .002*** 
 (.001) 
High Education  -.198*** 
 (.017) 
Income  -.113*** 
 (.003) 
Social Trust  -.040** 
 (.016) 
Married  -.027* 
 (.015) 
Employed  -.106*** 
 (.015) 
Country-year level 
Economic Globalization .128 
 (.144) 
Economic Globalization2 -.000 
 (.000) 
GDP PC .591 
 (.391) 
GINI  -.011 
 (.010) 
GDP PC*Economic Globalization  -.015 
 (.015) 
GDP PC*Economic Globalization2 .000 
 (.000) 
Random Effects 
se2 8.002 
su20 .488 
sv20 .218 
 -2LL -454 681 
 -2LL change .000 
 
Note: *** = p<0.01, ** = p<0.05, * = p<0.1. se2 = variance of level-1 residual, su20 = variance of level-2 residual, 
sv20 = variance of level-3 residual. 
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Table A4 – Random Intercept Model with GOVERNMENT RESPONSIBILITY as Dependent 
Variable. Regression Coefficients with Standard Errors in Parentheses.   
 
 Model 7 
Constant 1.860 
 (14.30) 
Individual level 
Woman .143*** 
 (.014) 
Age .002*** 
 (.001) 
High Education  -.198*** 
 (.017) 
Income -.113*** 
 (.003) 
Social Trust -.040** 
 (.016) 
Married -.027* 
 (.015) 
Employed -.106*** 
 (.015) 
Country-year level 
Economic Globalization .064 
 (.251) 
Economic Globalization2 -.000 
 (.000) 
GDP PC .768 
 (3.436) 
GDP2 -.015 
 (.203) 
GINI -.012 
 (.010) 
GDP PC*Economic Globalization -.002 
 (.058) 
GDP PC2*Economic Globalization -.001 
 (.003) 
Random Effects 
se2 8.002 
su20  .490 
sv20  .213 
 -2LL -454681 
 -2LL change .320 
 
Note: *** = p<0.01, ** = p<0.05, * = p<0.1. se2 = variance of level-1 residual, su20 = variance of level-2 residual, 
sv20 = variance of level-3 residual. 
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Table A5 – Random Intercept Model with GOVERNMENT RESPONSIBILITY as Dependent 
Variable. Regression Coefficients with Standard Errors in Parentheses.   
Note: *** = p<0.01, ** = p<0.05, * = p<0.1. se2 = variance of level-1 residual, su20 = variance of level-2 
residual, sv20 = variance of level-3 residual. 
  Model 0 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 
Constant 5.967*** 6.479*** 7.586*** 6.200*** 7.122*** 1.968 3.121 7.133*** 
 (.101) (.102) (.282) (.580) (1.126) (2.032) (3.474) (1.128) 
Individual level         
Woman  .143*** .143*** .143*** .143*** .143*** .143*** .141*** 
  (.014) (.014) (.014) (.014) (.014) (.014) (.014) 
Age  .002*** .002*** .002*** .002*** .002*** .002*** .002*** 
  (.001) (.001) (.001) (.001) (.001) (.001) (.001) 
High Education   -.198***  -.198***  -.198***  -.198***  -.198***  -.198***  -.385*** 
  (.017) (.017) (.017) (.017) (.017) (.017) (.123) 
Income   -.113***  -.113***  -.112***  -.112***  -.113***  -.113***  -.113*** 
  (.003) (.003) (.003) (.003) (.003) (.003) (.003) 
Social Trust   -.041***  -.041**  -.040**  -.040**  -.040**  -.040**   -.048*** 
  (.016) (.016) (.016) (.016) (.016) (.016) (.016) 
Married   -.027*  -.027*  -.027*  -.027*  -.027*  -.027*  -.030** 
  (.015) (.015) (.015) (.015) (.015) (.015) (.015) 
Employed   -.106***  -.106***  -.106***  -.106***  -.106***  -.106***  -.105*** 
  (.015) (.015) (.015) (.015) (.015) (.015) (.015) 
Country-year level         
Economic Globalization    -.019*** .036* .039* .127*** .069 .039* 
   (.001) (.020) (.020) (.036) (.148) (.021) 
Economic Globalization2     -.001***  -.000**  -.000 .000  -.001*** 
    (.000) (.000) (.000) (.000) (.000) 
Democracy      -.048  -.049  -.052  -.048 
     (.035) (.034) (.035) (.035) 
GDP PC      -.057 .654** .537  -.054 
     (.118) (.263) (.389) (.119) 
GINI      -.008  -.013  -.013  -.008 
     (.010) (.010) (.010) (.010) 
GDP PC*Economic Globalization       -.015***  -.008  
      (.005) (.045)  
GDP PC*Economic Globalization2        -.000  
       (.000)  
High Education*Economic 
Globalization         -.002 
        (.004) 
High Education*Economic 
Globalization2        .000** 
        (.000) 
Random Effects         
se2 8.108 8.002 8.002 8.002 8.002 8.002 8.002 8.000 
su20 .511 .497 .506 .490 .491    .485 .487 .358 
sv20 .492 .457 .309 .282 .257 .210 .207  .132  
 -2LL -455911 -454697 -454689 -454686 -454684 -454680 -454680 -454652 
 -2LL change   2427.61*** 15.14*** 7.22**  3.25 8.57 *** 0.17 63.49*** 
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Table A6 – Random Intercept Model with GOVERNMENT RESPONSIBILITY as Dependent 
Variable. Regression Coefficients with Standard Errors in Parentheses.   
 
  Model 0 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 
Constant 6.240*** 6.771*** 7.237*** 7.272*** 7.336*** .027 9.852 7.528*** 
 (.185) (.193) (.635) (1.643) (2.171) (5.886) (13.30) (2.184) 
Individual level         
Woman  .119*** .120*** .120*** .119*** .119*** .119*** .114*** 
  (.035) (.035) (.035) (.035) (.035) (.035) (.035) 
Age  .002 .002 .002 .002 .002 .002 .002 
  (.001) (.001) (.001) (.001) (.001) (.001) (.001) 
High Education   -.239***  -.239***  -.239***  -.239***  -.239***  -.240***  -1.094*** 
  (.046) (.046) (.046) (.046) (.046) (.046) (.390) 
Income   -.110***  -.110***  -.110***  -.110***  -.110***  -.110***  -.112*** 
  (.008) (.008) (.008) (.008) (.008) (.008) (.008) 
Social Trust   -.001  -.002  -.003  -.002  -.002  -.002  -.012 
  (.042) (.042) (.042) (.042) (.042) (.042) (.042) 
Married  .013 .012 .012 .012 .012 .012 .007 
  (.039) (.039) (.039) (.039) (.039) (.039) (.039) 
Employed   -.144***  -.144***  -.144***  -.144***  -.144***  -.143***  -.144*** 
  (.037) (.037) (.037) (.037) (.037) (.037) (.037) 
Union Member   -.097  -.097  -.097  -.097  -.097  -.098  -.099 
  (.062) (.062) (.062) (.062) (.062) (.062) (.062) 
Job Safety   -.057  -.057  -.057  -.057  -.057  -.056  -.053 
  (.036) (.036) (.036) (.036) (.036) (.036) (.036) 
Country-year level         
Economic Globalization    -.009  -.010  -.005  -.005  -.360  -.011 
   (.011) (.060) (.062) (.074) (.508) (.062) 
Economic Globalization2     -.000  -.000 .001 .005  -.000 
    (.001) (.001) (.001) (.001) (.001) 
GDP PC     .057 1.357 .269 .060 
     (.217) (1.000) (1.652) (.218) 
GINI      -.016  -.012  -.017  -.016 
     (.021) (.020) (.021) (.021) 
GDP PC*Economic Globalization       -.024 .021  
      (.018) (.058)  
GDP PC*Economic Globalization2        -.000  
       (.001)  
High Education*Economic Globalization        .020 
        (.014) 
High Education*Economic Globalization2         -.000 
        (.000) 
Random Effects         
se2 8.911 8.803 8.803 8.803 8.803 8.803 8.803 8.797  
su20 .457 .434 .425 .425 .412 .386 .377 .416 
sv20 .457 .434 .425 .425 .412 .386 .377 .416 
 -2LL -77305 -77118 -77118 -77118 -77117 -77116 -77116 -77107 
 -2LL change  374.89*** 0.59 0.000 0.85  1.71 0.67 19.57*** 
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Table A7 – Random Intercept Model with PRIVATE VS STATE OWNERSHIP OF BUSINESS as 
Dependent Variable. Regression Coefficients with Standard Errors in Parentheses.   
 
 Model 0 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 
Constant 5.215*** 5.565*** 5.836*** 4.966*** 6.132*** .903  -.084 6.033*** 
 (.101) (.103) (.282) (.552) (1.113) (1.874) (3.015) (1.116) 
Individual level         
Woman  .351*** .351*** .351*** .351*** .351*** .351*** .348*** 
  (.014) (.014) (.014) (.014) (.014) (.014) (.014) 
Age  .003*** .003*** .003*** .003*** .003*** .003*** .003*** 
  (.001) (.001) (.001) (.001) (.001) (.001) (.001) 
High Education   -.363***  -.363***  -.363***  -.363***  -.363***  -.363***  -.075 
  (0.0179) (0.0179) (0.0179) (0.0179) (0.0179) (0.0179) (0.124) 
Income   -.115***  -.115***  -.115***  -.115***  -.115***  -.115***  -.115*** 
  (.003) (.003) (.003) (.003) (.003) (.003) (.003) 
Social Trust   -.055***  -.055***  -.055***  -.055***  -.054***  -.054***  -.066*** 
  (.016) (.016) (.016) (.016) (.016) (.016) (.016) 
Married  .050*** .050*** .050*** .050*** .050*** .050*** .044*** 
  (.015) (.015) (.015) (.015) (.015) (.015) (.015) 
Employed   -.072***  -.072***  -.072***  -.072***  -.072***  -.072***  -.071*** 
  (.015) (.015) (.015) (.015) (.015) (.015) (.015) 
Country-year level         
Economic Globalization    -.005 .031 .023 .118*** .170 .029 
   (.005) (.020) (.020) (.033) (.128) (.019) 
Economic Globalization2     -.000*  -.000 .000  -.000  -.000 
    (.000) (.000) (.000) (.001) (.000) 
GDP PC      -.233** .488** .593*  -.231** 
     (.107) (.235) (.345) (.107) 
GINI     .021** .016* .016* .022** 
     (.010) (.010) (.010) (.010) 
GDP PC*Economic Globalization       -.015***  -.021  
      (.005) (.014)  
GDP PC*Economic Globalization2       .000  
       (.000)  
High Education*Economic Globalization         -.025*** 
        (.005) 
High Education*Economic Globalization2        .000*** 
        (.000) 
Random Effects         
se2 7.692 7.530 7.530 7.530 7.529 7.530 7.530 7.522 
su20 .194 .208 .215 .214 .216 .220 .218 .212 
sv20 .610 .566 .536 .509 .408 .324 .328 .416 
 -2LL -397113 -395373 -395373 -395371 -395365 -395360 -395360 -395282 
 -2LL change  3479.50*** 0.98 3.33 11.37*** 10.68*** 0.17 167.50*** 
 
Note: *** = p<0.01, ** = p<0.05, * = p<0.1. se2 = variance of level-1 residual, su20 = variance of level-2 
residual, sv20 = variance of level-3 residual. 
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Table A8 – Random Intercept Model with INCOME EQUALITY as Dependent Variable. 
Regression Coefficients with Standard Errors in Parentheses.   
 
 Model 0 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 
Constant 5.078*** 5.604*** 5.094*** 5.161*** 2.387** 3.164 6.497* 2.316* 
 (.102) (.106) (.309) (.636) (1.198) (2.208) (3.635) (1.196) 
Individual level         
Woman  .110*** .110*** .110*** .110*** .110*** .110*** .109*** 
  (.014) (.014) (.014) (.014) (.014) (.014) (.014) 
Age  .004*** .004*** .004*** .004*** .004*** .004*** .004*** 
  (.001) (.001) (.001) (.001) (.001) (.001) (.001) 
High Education   -.387***  -.387***  -.387***  -.387***  -.387***  -.387***  -.075 
  (.018) (.018) (.018) (.018) (.018) (.018) (.124) 
Income   -.129***  -.129***  -.129***  -.129***  -.129***  -.129***  -.129*** 
  (.003) (.003) (.003) (.003) (.003) (.003) (.003) 
Social Trust  .166*** .166*** .166*** .166*** .166*** .166*** .162*** 
  (.016) (.016) (.016) (.016) (.016) (.016) (.016) 
Married   -.053***  -.053***  -.053***  -.053***  -.053***  -.053***  -.054*** 
  (.015) (.015) (.015) (.015) (.015) (.015) (.015) 
Employed   -.133***  -.133***  -.133***  -.134***  -.134***  -.134***  -.133*** 
  (.015) (.015) (.015) (.015) (.015) (.015) (.015) 
Country-year level         
Economic Globalization    .009* .006 .009  -.004  -.173 .013 
   (.005) (.023) (.021) (.039) (.151) (.021) 
Economic Globalization2    -.000  -.000  -.000 .002  -.000 
    (.000) (.000) (.000) (.000) (.000) 
GDP PC     .409*** .303  -.047 .408*** 
     (.115) (.280) (.413) (.115) 
GINI      -.011  -.012  -.013  -.015 
     (.011) (.011) (.011) (.011) 
GDP PC*Economic Globalization      0.002 .020  
      (.005) (.016)  
GDP PC*Economic Globalization2        -.000  
       (.000)  
High Education*Economic Globalization         -.016*** 
        (.005) 
High Education*Economic Globalization2        .000*** 
        (.000) 
Random Effects         
se2 8.248 8.077 8.077 8.077 8.077 8.077 8.077 8.076 
su20 .432 .454 .449 .449 .441 .444 .439 .441 
sv20 .512 .502 .483 .481 .359 .353 .352 .358 
 -2LL -435731 -433891 -433890 -433890 -433882 -433882 -433882 -433869 
 -2LL change  3679.23*** 3.05* 0.01 15.09*** 0.17 1.33 26.64*** 
 
Note: *** = p<0.01, ** = p<0.05, * = p<0.1. se2 = variance of level-1 residual, su20 = variance of level-2 
residual, sv20 = variance of level-3 residual. 
 
 
 
